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Abstract
We provide an overview of recent research on belief and opinion dynamics in social
networks. We discuss both Bayesian and non-Bayesian models of social learning and
focus on the implications of the form of learning (e.g., Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian),
the sources of information (e.g., observation vs. communication), and the structure of
social networks in which individuals are situated on three key questions: (1) whether
social learning will lead to consensus, i.e., to agreement among individuals starting with
different views; (2) whether social learning will effectively aggregate dispersed informa-
tion and thus weed out incorrect beliefs; (3) whether media sources, prominent agents,
politicians and the state will be able to manipulate beliefs and spread misinformation
in a society.
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1 Introduction
Almost all social interactions are, at least in part, shaped by beliefs and opinions. Most of
this we take for granted. To start with the most mundane example, few of us would have
sampled all the different types of food or entertainment on offer around the world, but
most of us have formed beliefs and opinions about which ones we would like, and every
day we make decisions on the basis of these beliefs. More important and more interesting
from the viewpoint of social science, most of us also have a set of (often complex and
nuanced) beliefs about how others will act in different social situations, which guide
our behavior in social contexts ranging from business meetings to competitive sports.
These beliefs are intimately intertwined with “social norms”, such as what we deem as
acceptable behavior (to help somebody who has fallen down in the street and to not
be part of activities that would harm others and so on). They also shape our political
participation and attitudes. Political participation is certainly a “learned” attribute:
those of us lucky enough to live in democracies learn about and believe in the need
for and the virtues of political participation and often take part in elections and other
political activities. And when we go to the polls, which candidate we support is again
shaped by our beliefs and opinions about what is a just society, which candidates are
more reliable and so on. Many who are born in repressive societies instead form beliefs
about the dangers of such types of political participation, though some of them are also
encouraged as much by their beliefs as by their friends and family, to take part in protests
against regimes they deem as unjust or illegitimate. The importance of the beliefs we
hold for how our daily lives and society in general function cannot be overstated.
Where do these beliefs and opinions come from? While, as evolutionary biology has
taught us, certain phenotypic characteristics have biological and genetic basis, it is un-
likely that any of our beliefs are imprinted on us by our genes. Instead, we acquire our
beliefs and opinions through various types of learning experiences. Some of this learn-
ing takes place within families, when parents teach certain basic principles and beliefs
to their children (e.g., Boyd and Richerson (1985), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981),
Richerson and Boyd (2005), and Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)). Much of it, however,
takes place through a process of “social learning,” whereby individuals obtain informa-
tion and update their beliefs and opinions as a result of their own experiences, their
observations of others’ actions and experiences, the communication with others about
their beliefs and behavior, news from media sources, and propaganda and indoctrination
from political leaders and the state. While the process of learning by an individual from
his or her experience can be viewed as an “individual” learning problem, it also has an
explicitly “social” character. This is in three related but distinct senses:
1. Learning is social because any given individual observes the behavior of or receives
information through communication with a small subset of society—those we may
want refer to as her social network, consisting of her friends, her coworkers and
peers, her distant and close family members, and a certain group of leaders that
she listens to and respects (e.g., village leaders, trusted politicians, trusted media
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sources and so on). We can thus not separate the process of learning and opinion
formation from the specific social network in which an individual is situated.
2. Learning is also social because an individual will need to interpret the information
that she obtains in a social context. She will inevitably trust some information
more than others and she will have to form conjectures about the sources of the
experiences and the intentions of members of her social network in communicating
certain information to her (below, we will refer to this as her conjectures about
the strategies of others).
3. Learning is also social because these interactions will lead to dynamics in learning
and opinion formation. Once an individual obtains a piece of information from a
specific peer in her social network, then she may pass on this information or some
version of it to other members of her social network. The latter will typically have
their own social networks that do not overlap with hers, so that this information,
regardless of whether it is accurate or not, may spread both within and beyond
the initial social network in which it originated.1
The social aspect of belief and opinion formation—social learning for short—will
be our central focus in this paper. We will investigate how the structure of social
relationships in society, the (potentially selective) trust that individuals have towards
others and their conjectures about others’ behavior and intentions impact the formation
of their beliefs and opinions. We will refer to these influences as the impact of the social
network on opinion formation. For concreteness, we will study the impact of the social
network in the context of three specific questions, which have received the bulk of the
attention from the literature:
a. Will social learning lead different individuals to hold beliefs that are in agreement,
even though they might start with different views (priors) and observe the ac-
tions of and engage in communication with different subsets of the society? Put
differently, will a consensus form among different individuals?
b. Will social learning effectively aggregate dispersed information about an underlying
state that represents some social or economic situation? Will there be asymptotic
learning (learning in the long run) of the underlying state which is the source of
uncertainty? For example, in many situations there will be sufficient information
in society to settle a question such as whether a particular economic, social or
political action is desirable, but different parts of this information will be held by
different agents rather than by a single entity. In this situation, whether social
learning through observation and communication will be able to aggregate those
1Another related social aspect, which has received less attention, is that the social network of the
individual might change dynamically and endogenously as a result of the information that she receives.
For example, because of some new information that she obtains, she may decide to no longer trust some
of her friends or previously trusted information sources.
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dispersed parts becomes central. A corollary to this question is the following: will
social learning guarantee that incorrect beliefs (which can be refuted on the basis
of the available evidence) disappear?
c. Will media sources, “prominent agents,” politicians and officers of the state be able
to manipulate the beliefs of individuals, indoctrinate them and convince them of
views that may not be justifiable by the data and evidence? Put differently, how
much room is there for belief manipulation and misinformation?
While most of these questions are asked as simple “yes or no” questions, the answers
we will present, on the basis of a large body of research over the past several decades, will
often provide additional conditions and insights under which the answer will be yes. We
will also attempt, whenever we can, to relate these conditions to the impact of the social
network (in particular to structural properties of the social network) in which agents
are situated. In some cases, these mathematical conditions will be straightforward to
map to reality, though in many instances more work is necessary to either sharpen these
conditions or to create a better bridge between the mathematical results and the reality
that they are supposed to represent.2
The issue of whether a group of agents who hold dispersed information will be able
to aggregate this information and reach a consensus, and in fact, a correct consensus,
has been the focus of a large body of mathematical and philosophical work throughout
the last several centuries. The seminal work by Marquis de Condorcet, which is the basis
of what is now referred to as the Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, is particularly noteworthy.
Condorcet (1788) observed that truthful reporting of information by a large group of
individuals with each holding a belief or piece of information correlated with some un-
derlying state θ is sufficient for aggregation of information. A similar perspective, but
based both on theoretical reasoning and empirical backing, was developed a century later
by the British scientist (and arguably one of the founders of modern statistics), Francis
Galton. In a famous Nature article published in 1907, Galton espoused the view that a
group of relatively uninformed individuals would collectively have much more knowledge
than any single one of them. Galton visited an agricultural fair in Plymouth in 1906 to
investigate a specific application of this idea. Participants at the fair were asked to guess
the weight of an ox (after the animal was slaughtered and dressed, meaning the head and
other parts were removed). Eight hundred people apparently took part in this contest.
Galton was well aware that these were no experts and in fact, in the Nature article that
he wrote in the following year, he stated: “[... most of the contestants were...] as well
2Like almost all of the literature in this area, in investigating this question, we will focus on the
behavior of opinions and beliefs in a society in the “long run,” meaning after a sufficiently long time
has elapsed. This will enable us to develop sharper mathematical insights, though it should be borne in
mind throughout that the relevant “long run” might be longer than the lifespan of a single individual
and might arrive so slowly that non-long-run behavior might be of greater interest. We view the
development of more powerful mathematical models and more insightful analysis of short-run opinion
and belief dynamics as an exciting and important area for future work.
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fitted for making a just estimate of the dressed weight of an ox, as an average voter is
judging the merits of most political issues on which he votes.” The remarkable thing
reported in the Nature article was that, when Galton looked at the 787 valid entries, he
found that the median estimate was extremely close to the actual weight of the ox. This
estimate was 1197 pounds, while the actual weight was 1198. Galton concluded:
“The result seems more creditable to the trustworthiness of a democratic
judgment than might have been expected.”
Despite these famous arguments, it is now generally believed that this type of ag-
gregation of dispersed information is neither a theoretical nor an empirical necessity.
Instead, in some situations this type of aggregation may take place (at least approxi-
mately), while in many others it will not. In fact, disagreement on many economic, social
and political phenomena, such as the scientific standing of evolution, the likelihood that
US health care reforms will increase overall spending, whether Iranian elections in 2009
did produce a majority for Ahmadinejad, whether the current trend of emissions will
lead to significant climate change, whether a particular government or politician is com-
petent, and so on, are ubiquitous, despite the availability of a reasonable amount of
data bearing on these questions. This suggests that useful models of learning should
not always predict consensus, and certainly not the weeding out of incorrect beliefs.
Instead, these should merely be possible outcomes among others, depending on the na-
ture of disagreement (e.g., whether some people are likely to support an incompetent
government because of a specific subset of the policies they adopt), the informativeness
of the information agents possess and receive (e.g., whether there is new and relatively
precise information arriving on an issue, or whether social learning is mostly a ques-
tion of aggregating already existing priors and information), and the structure of the
social network leading to the exchange of information (e.g., whether there are relatively
isolated clusters of individuals not communicating with those outside their clusters).
When consensus and the weeding out of incorrect beliefs are not guaranteed, there
will also be room for systematic indoctrination and spread of misinformation by certain
“prominent” agents, media sources, politicians and the state. The ability of authoritar-
ian regimes such as those in China and Iran to indoctrinate significant subsets of their
populations with nationalistic or religious propaganda underscores this possibility (but
the fact that these governments place great emphasis on controlling all news sources,
and especially the Internet and foreign news, also highlights that such indoctrination is
not easy or automatic).
More specific evidence that this type of influence on beliefs exists and can be impor-
tant comes from DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), who provide an illustration of this
by studying the expansion of the Fox News cable channel across US towns. As is
well-documented and accepted, the coverage in Fox News is more right-wing and pro-
Republican than that of other TV stations and most other media sources. If media
sources can indeed have a significant influence on opinions and beliefs, for example, by
spreading misinformation, or more benignly by providing information that others would
4
not and blocking some information that others would provide, then we might expect that
exposure to Fox News may increase the support for the Republican Party. DellaVigna
and Kaplan exploit the fact that the Fox News channel was introduced in October 1996,
and then spread across different towns slowly, reaching several towns before 2000, and
many after 2000, depending on its agreements and the decisions of local cable companies.
DellaVigna and Kaplan then compare the change in the vote share of the Republican
candidate between the 1996 and the 2000 elections. The 1996 elections were before the
introduction of Fox News, so differential change between towns with and without ac-
cess to this channel can be interpreted as the impact of Fox News. They find that the
Republican candidate gained between 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in towns where the
population had access to the Fox News cable channel compared to similar towns without
such access. The available evidence also suggests that there are certain marked differ-
ences in opinions (often very strongly held) between individuals consistently watching
the Fox News vs. those obtaining their news from CNN or CNBC.
This discussion highlights the need for developing models in which certain subset
of agents can have a major influence on the opinions of others (possibly by spreading
misinformation) and also models in which even in the very long run, consensus may not
arise. These models, though generally in their infancy, provide a potential framework
for the study of persistent disagreements and indoctrination, and might also generate
insights about what types of societies (partly based on their social networks) might be
able to develop some “robustness” to indoctrination and misinformation.
We next provide a brief outline of the rest of this paper. In Section 2, we start by dis-
cussing two alternative approaches to social learning and opinion formation, one based
on Bayesian updating of beliefs, and the other one based on non-Bayesian reasonable
“rules of thumb” on how people form their opinions on the basis of evidence and social
influences. The Bayesian learning approaches assume that individuals update their be-
liefs optimally (from a statistical point of view) given an underlying model of the world.
We emphasize in this section that Bayesian approaches make several demanding require-
ments from the agents. For example, they require that the agents have a reliable “model
of the world” enabling them to assign priors to all possible events and that they can
update their beliefs by forming complex conjectures on the behavior of others in society.
They also put considerable structure on the updating problem by ruling out many states
as “zero probability events”. These features also imply that Bayesian approaches might
end up putting too much structure, making issues such as indoctrination and spread
of misinformation more difficult, almost impossible, to model. Finally, the inference
problem facing Bayesian agents, particularly when they are situated in social networks
in which information travels in complex ways, is quite challenging. While non-Bayesian
rule-of-thumb learning models avoid some of these difficulties and might provide better
approximations to the behavior of most agents, we do not currently have sufficient em-
pirical evidence to distinguish between several different types of non-Bayesian models.
This suggests that Bayesian approaches might be a useful benchmark for understanding
the implications of several different types of deviations from Bayesian updating and dif-
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ferent rules-of-thumb behaviors. In the end, both Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches
provide useful insights and contrasting them is often instructive. Ultimately, which class
of models is most appropriate should depend on the specific question and social context.
For example, questions related to belief manipulation and misinformation appear to be
more naturally treated in a non-Bayesian context.
In Section 3, we present two models of Bayesian social learning by a set of agents
observing others’ actions or communicating with each other over a social network. We
also briefly discuss the role of markets in the formation of opinions. We emphasize
several important themes in this section. First, we illustrate why the Bayesian models
are a natural benchmark, but also why they involve a high degree of sophisticated and
complex reasoning on the part of the agents. Second, we show that, even though agents
are assumed to be highly rational and have the correct model of the world on which they
base their belief updates, strategic interactions that inevitably exist in such Bayesian
environments place endogenous limits on the aggregation of dispersed information. We
will illustrate this by showing the emergence of a phenomenon often referred to as
“herding,” in which Bayesian rational agents follow others’ actions or opinions even when
these are only imperfectly informative (and in the process, prevent the aggregation of
information from which others would have also benefited). Third, we also show that
even when aggregation of information breaks down and social learning leads to incorrect
beliefs, there are strong forces towards consensus in Bayesian models. They thus do not
present a natural framework for understanding persistent disagreements. Finally, there
will also be natural limits on the spread of misinformation in Bayesian models. While
herding is possible, herding will never happen on an action that is likely to be a “bad
action”.
In Section 4, we present several non-Bayesian models of learning. We start with a
simple and widely used model, the so-called DeGroot model of belief updating. We
emphasize why this is a simple and tractable model, but also why it illustrates some
of the shortcomings of non-Bayesian models. We then present a variant of this model
which avoids some of these shortcomings and also enables a first attempt at modeling the
possible spread of misinformation (propagated by a set of “prominent agents” which may
include community leaders as well as media outlets). However, in this benchmark model,
even though misinformation might spread, persistent disagreement is not possible and
opinions will converge to a consensus (though this consensus is stochastic and cannot be
known in advance). We then present an extended model in which both misinformation
and persistent disagreement can coexist, and highlight possible research directions in
this area.
Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion of future research. Throughout, we have
tried to ground the discussion sufficiently by presenting baseline models and some rele-
vant details of the analysis that will be useful in future work, but we have economized
on space by referring the reader to the original papers for the proofs and more involved
results.
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2 Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Perspectives
Opinion formation is directly or indirectly about learning. An individual starts with
some views (priors) about a subject, which will affect her economic, political or social
decisions, and then updates them according to some process. Thus overall, opinion
formation has three key components:
1. Priors. Any model of opinion formation has to start with some type of prior
opinions for an individual or group of individuals. For example, an individual
might start with “diffuse priors” meaning that she can be easily swayed by the
information she receives. Or an individual might have such strong views that her
posterior opinion will not be very different from her prior opinion even after she
receives a substantial amount of new data and communications.
2. Sources of information. An individual will update her prior based on new informa-
tion that she receives. This might come from her own experiences, from observing
others’ actions and experiences, or from communication with others. Any model
of opinion formation will implicitly or explicitly specify the sources of information,
which will in general be at least partly affected by an individual’s “social network”.
For example, both when it comes to observing others’ experiences and to commu-
nication, an individual is much more likely to learn from and communicate with
some people than others—typically, family members, friends, coworkers and other
peers are much more likely to influence an individual by communicating with her
or by providing her information on the basis of their experiences.
3. Method of information processing. The third and key part of the process of opinion
formation is how the individual will combine her priors and the information she
receives. By Bayesian models, we refer to those in which individuals use Bayes
rule, to form the “best” mathematical estimate of the relevant unknowns given
their priors and understanding of the world. Non-Bayesian models are defined
as all those that are not Bayesian. They include information updating processes
that similarly combine priors and information to yield a posterior, but they could
also include various approaches that appear “non-informational” at first sight,
for example, those in which an individual might change her opinion in a manner
similar to being “infected” by a disease.
In this section, we first discuss the basic approach of Bayesian models and why
they might be a useful starting point. We then discuss several cognitive difficulties
that Bayesian models face and discuss some alternatives. Finally, we conclude with an
analysis demonstrating how Bayesian updating does not always lead to consensus and
information aggregation as is sometimes presumed.
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2.1 Bayesian Approaches
The Bayes rule is familiar and simple in its abstract form. It states that for two prob-
abilistic events A and B, the probability that A is true conditional on B being true,
P (A | B), is given by
P (A | B) = P (A ∩B)
P (B)
=
P (B | A) · P (A)
P (B)
, (1)
i.e., by the ratio of the probability of the event that both A and B are true, P (A ∩B),
and the unconditional probability of event B, P (B). Since a similar relationship holds
for P (B | A) (i.e., P (B | A) = P (A ∩B) /P (A)), the second expression follows. This
formula is very powerful when we apply it to the issue of social (and for that matter
individual) learning.
Consider a situation in which an individual is trying to form an opinion about some
underlying state θ ∈ Θ. The state could correspond to some economic variable, such as
potential earnings in an occupation or profitability of a line of business, or to a social
or political variable, such as whether a politician is to be trusted or a certain ideology
is useful or beneficial. As we noted in the previous subsection, he would first have to
start with some “priors”. We can capture this by a function P (θ), which gives the
prior belief of the individual about the likelihood of each possible value of θ in Θ. The
second key ingredient of learning is the information that the individual will receive. Let
us represent this information by some signal s ∈ S. This could correspond to some
observation concerning θ (e.g., how much do others in this occupation earn? How much
profit do they make from this line of business? Is there any evidence that the politician
in question is corrupt?).
The Bayesian approach then posits that the individual will update her prior after
observing s according to a version of (1), in particular:
P (θ | s) = P (s | θ) · P (θ)
P (s)
. (2)
This equation implies that, provided that the individual knows P (s | θ), P (s) and P (θ),
she can compute the probability that the true state is θ given the signal s, P (θ | s).
That the individual knows P (θ) implies that she has priors on each possible value of θ.
That she knows P (s | θ) implies that she has an understanding of what types of signals
to expect when the true value is θ.
These are not innocuous requirements. We can think of these two requirements
together as positing that the individual has a reliable model of the world, meaning that
her views about the likelihood of different underlying states and the distribution of the
signals conditional on the states are accurate or at the very least, “reliable”. As we will
see, such models of the world play a central role in Bayesian approaches.
More specifically, the first requirement implies that the individual has a complete set
of priors. When θ takes on a few values, this may be a reasonable requirement. But when
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the set of possible values of θ, Θ, is large, this requirement becomes quite demanding.
From a practical point of view, it implies that the individual needs to have a fairly
complex view of the world, assigning priors (probabilities) to each possible event. From
a mathematical point of view, this also requires some care, since if Θ is uncountable, one
would have to define priors (and of course probabilities) only for measurable subsets of
Θ, and this implies that many possible states must receive zero probability according to
any well defined prior or not even have well-defined priors (see, e.g., Schmeidler (1989),
Binmore (2008)). We will see in subsection 2.3 that the presence of “zero probability”
events plays a crucial (and sometimes subtle) role in Bayesian updating.
The second requirement, that the individual should know, or should have well formed
opinions about, P (s | θ), is equally stringent. This quantity captures the conditional
probability law of the signal s for each possible value of θ. Even in the simplest situations,
this might be too much information for an individual to process and it could be difficult
for her to have reliable knowledge about. And again, if she does not have reliable
knowledge about P (s | θ), (2) will not imply accurate posteriors and learning that follows
from Bayesian updating may be unreliable. However, the real challenging implication of
the requirement that the individual should have reliable knowledge about P (s | θ) arises
in social, rather than individual, learning situations. Suppose, for example, that s is (or
includes) information that an individual obtains from the actions of others. This might
be the choice of somebody with experience, or information about their performance,
or something that they directly communicate to the individual. In all of these cases,
there would be no unique function P (s | θ) describing the relationship between s and θ
independent of the behavioral rule or strategy of the other players.
Let us consider a specific example to elaborate on this point. Consider the problem
of an individual, “the observer,” learning about some underlying state θ, which, for
example, corresponds to how profitable a certain line of business is. In doing so, she
will observe the success y of some other agent. Let us posit that there is a relationship
between success denoted by y and the underlying state θ, but this relationship also
depends on the effort that an agent exerts, e. Thus we can write this relationship as
P (y | θ, e). Suppose, putting aside the previous difficulties we have raised, that the
observer fully understands and has reliable knowledge on this relationship. But this
would be useless to her unless she also knows e. This means that beyond understanding
the relevant “physical” or “technological” relationships between the underlying state,
effort and success, the observer must also have a good understanding of the “strategic”
relationships and form the right conjectures about e. This problem becomes much more
complex when e itself is chosen by each agent as a function of their own beliefs about
θ and their own observations. These issues will be central in our analysis in the next
section when we study Bayesian models of observational learning. For now, our purpose
has been to highlight the complexities that this might involve.
Where do the reliable models of the world for Bayesian agents come from? There
is no good answer to this question, and in most Bayesian models, it is assumed, as we
will see, that individuals have beliefs about P (θ) and P (s | θ) that coincide with the
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true data generating process and with each other’s beliefs, and in fact, there is common
knowledge that they all share the same priors. The only uncertainty is about the specific
value of θ; there is no uncertainty or doubt about the underlying model of the world, and
this plays a central role in the implications of Bayesian models. While mathematically
tractable and powerful, this approach raises further questions. Part of our interest in
opinion and belief dynamics is motivated by our desire to understand where a complex
set of beliefs that individuals hold come from. But assuming that they already start
with common beliefs on certain key parts of the model that correspond to the true
data generating process and that there is common knowledge on this, is potentially
quite restrictive. Some, following a view, forcefully articulated by LJ Savage in the
Foundations of Statistics (1954, p. 48) and the statement that Bayesian individuals
receiving informative signals about some underlying state θ should eventually learn and
agree on θ, maintain that common priors and common knowledge are justified or at the
very least are good approximations to reality. However, we will see in subsection 2.3
below that the Bayesian foundations of such common priors are not necessarily very
strong. This argument raises further challenges for the Bayesian approach, at least in
the case that starts with a model of the world that is the same for all agents and is
common knowledge.
Overall, the requirements of the Bayesian approach may be quite challenging for
most individuals when it comes to complex issues. For this reason, some, like Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001), Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler (2007) and Gintis (2009), ar-
gue that a Bayesian perspective is often too restrictive. Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001),
for example, suggest that an approach for prior formulation based on “empirical fre-
quency” would be much more realistic and fruitful. Even if we can specify such priors
for individuals, posteriors implied by (2) would only be reliable if these priors are reli-
able. This, at least in part, shifts the burden to another requirement: individual should
have “reliable” priors, which as we will see in subsection 2.3, is not a trivial requirement
either.3
Despite all of these complexities and somewhat unrealistic assumptions about what
individuals need to know and what they should form conjectures on, we believe that the
Bayesian approach is a useful benchmark. This is not because the Bayesian approach
will necessarily make good predictions. Indeed, if the degree of complexity necessary for
informing Bayesian posteriors, for forming conjectures about what the underlying model
of the world is and how others behave, is too high, the predictions of the Bayesian
approach are unlikely to be realistic. Nevertheless, how agents learn and form their
opinions when they are acting in the Bayesian manner gives us an obvious reference point
to which non-Bayesian models can be compared. This is particularly important when
there are several alternative non-Bayesian models for which one wishes to understand
3As is well appreciated, trying to replace such priors by something akin to Laplace’s “principle of
insufficient reason” is hopeless. In some situations, priors will not matter much because they will be
overwhelmed by data. We will discuss below how Bayesian updating and abundant data may not be
sufficient for this, however, and priors may not be overwhelmed by data in many relevant situations.
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where certain predictions come from and how plausible they may be.
2.2 Non-Bayesian Approaches
Non-Bayesian approaches start by specifying simple rules of thumb, which are either
motivated by how people behave or appear to behave in simple situations, including
in laboratory experiments, or are justified because they are both simple and lead to
a process of opinion formation that has desirable properties. The desirable properties
might be “normative,” meaning that they lead to the formation of accurate opinions or
enable agents to learn the underlying state, or they may be “positive,” meaning that
opinion dynamics might match some data we have available.
The literature has considered several non-Bayesian approaches. The simplest ones,
used both in economics and in other fields, involve some type of imitation. For instance,
each individual could, with some probability, adopt the behavior or beliefs of some others
she knows or has observed, or alternatively, she may use a combination of their behavior
or beliefs to fashion her own. A specific example of this type of learning is the DeGroot
model which we discuss in subsection 4.1, where each individual updates her beliefs as a
weighted average of the beliefs of her social neighbors, with weights given by the “trust”
she has for those neighbors (see also DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003), Ellison
and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)). Another example will be one in which individuals meet
one person at a time from their social neighborhood (friends, coworkers or peers) and
update their opinion to a weighted average of their initial opinion and the opinion of the
person they have just met (see subsection 4.2).
In economics, game theory and biology, several other alternatives are also used, al-
though for space reasons, we will not be able to discuss them in great detail in the current
paper. The most important idea in many of these alternatives is that individuals should
change their views in the direction of beliefs and actions that have been more success-
ful. Put in terms of the discussion of imitation above, these models still involve some
amount of imitation, but observations are accompanied by some information about the
performance of different alternatives. Then the alternatives that have exhibited a better
performance are more likely to be imitated or receive greater weight. A particularly
simple version is the so-called replicator dynamics inspired by evolutionary biology. In
replicator dynamics, just as in genetic evolution, particular actions or beliefs that have
performed better in the past are more likely to replicate and their fraction in the popula-
tion increases (e.g., Weibull (1995), Samuelson (1997), Sandholm (2010)). Suppose, for
example, that an individual is updating her beliefs about some variable θ correspond-
ing to whether a certain line of business is profitable. She observes the entry behavior
of some past agents and also receive some information about how successful they have
been. Simple imitation would involve a behavior based on the fraction of agents, among
those he has observed, that have chosen to enter into this line of business. Replicator
dynamics type updates, on the other hand, would involve the individual imitating one
of the past agents that has been “successful”. Other ideas have been used, particularly
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in the context of learning in games where agents learn not only an underlying state but
also the actions of other players in the game. These include fictitious play (e.g., Robin-
son (1951), Fudenberg and Levine (1998)) where individuals form beliefs about future
play based on past patterns and regret-based update rules (e.g., Foster and Vohra (1997,
1999), Hart and MasColell (2000)), where individuals choose actions that perform well
in the sense of minimizing regret, relative to the history of play.
A more general and flexible approach is adopted in the case-based decision theory
developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 2001) (see also Quine (1969) and Simon
(1957)). In this approach, beliefs are formed according to empirical similarity, mean-
ing that individuals form beliefs about a situation (decision problem) based on their
experiences in similar situations in the past, where similarities are defined by means
of an exogenously specified similarity function. The empirical similarity approach, as
well as the ideas based on replicator dynamics, fictitious play and regret matching, are
more flexible than the simple imitation-based rules of thumbs we will discuss below,
but they have similar implications (though also important differences). In particular,
the tendency towards consensus and the possibility that dispersed information may not
aggregate despite consensus are common features of these approaches.
In sociology and physics, several other forms of rule of thumb behavior are also used.
Most work in this area relies on classical models of interacting particle systems whose
motivation comes from statistical mechanics (see Liggett (1985) and references therein).
In these models, opinions are represented by either finitely many discrete values (as in
the Ising model, introduced by Glauber (1963) and the voter model, introduced indepen-
dently by Clifford and Sudbury (1973) and by Holley and Liggett (1975)), or continuous
values (as in the DeGroot model (1974) and the bounded confidence models of Krause
(2000) (further developed by Hegselmann and Krause (2002), Deffuant, Neau, Amblard
and Weisbuch (2000) and Weisbuch, Kirman and Herreiner (2000)). The opinions of
each agent evolve(s) dynamically over time as a function of their neighbors’ opinions.
A number of recent papers use these models to study various social phenomena, includ-
ing opinion formation, information transmission, and effects of opinion leaders, using
an analysis that is largely based on simulations (see Amblard, Deffuant, Faure, and
Weisbuch (2002), Fortunato and Stauffer (2005), Wu and Huberman (2008), Mobilia,
Petersen and Redner (2007)).
This array of choices illustrates the limits of our knowledge in this area. Each of these
rules leads to different types of behavior (and often, at least some of the implications
also depend on the specific parameters one chooses within a general class of rules). It is
conceivable that future work will bring additional information from empirical studies in
order to eliminate some possibilities and put more structure on remaining ones. How-
ever, until this happens, there is a high degree of arbitrariness. This often motivates
researchers to use either the Bayesian models or a benchmark where all of the relevant
information is learned or aggregated at least in the limit (“asymptotically”) as a way
of evaluating non-Bayesian models. We believe that both Bayesian and non-Bayesian
approaches are useful and generate instructive insights. Which type of approach is ap-
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propriate is likely to depend on the specific question being investigated. For example, we
will argue below that issues of persistent disagreements, misinformation and belief ma-
nipulation might be better analyzed using non-Bayesian approaches. In fact, it would
be difficult to understand the spread of misinformation and persistent disagreements
among individuals with access to similar information if we insist that all “reasonable”
learning models should be strictly Bayesian and/or lead to the efficient aggregation of
information.
One might still conjecture that non-Bayesian updating rules that lead to opinions
that are very different from Bayesian benchmarks or do not aggregate the available
information should not arise or survive. While comparison to these benchmarks is useful,
deviations from either the Bayesian benchmark or the benchmark in which relevant
information is aggregated effectively should not be viewed as potential shortcomings of
a model (since there is no reason to expect that reality is either Bayesian or “efficient”).
In fact, as we will see in the next section, aggregation of dispersed information is not
even a feature of most Bayesian models (even though individuals are highly sophisticated
and are assumed to have the correct model of the world).
2.3 Learning and Disagreement By Bayesian Agents
In this subsection, we first present the benchmark situation in which, in line with Sav-
age’s arguments, Bayesian updating leads to learning in a single agent problem and
to consensus when several agents learn from the same or similar information, provided
that some standard assumptions on priors and informativeness of signals are adopted.
However, the main message of this subsection will be more nuanced. We will illustrate
why the standard assumptions on priors and informativeness of signals are less innocu-
ous than commonly presumed. We will in fact show that under reasonable assumptions,
Bayesian updating will imply lack of learning and lack of consensus (even before we bring
in social learning aspects). The material in this section borrows heavily from Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007).
Bayesian Learning and Agreement
Consider two individuals, denoted by i = 1 and i = 2, who observe a sequence of signals
{st}nt=0 where st ∈ {a, b}. Throughout this section, we assume that both agents are
Bayesian. The underlying state is θ ∈ {A,B}, and agent i assigns ex ante probability
pii ∈ (0, 1) to θ = A (The generalization of the ideas presented here to more agents and
more states is straightforward). The individuals believe that, given θ, the signals are
exchangeable, i.e., they are independently and identically distributed with an unknown
distribution. More specifically, the probability of st = a given θ = A is an unknown
number pA; likewise, the probability of st = b given θ = B is an unknown number pB—as
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shown in the following table:
A B
a pA 1− pB
b 1− pA pB
Standard models, for example as in Savage (1954) can be thought of as special cases of
this model in which pA and pB are given and known. Here we will relax this assumption
and assume that there is potentially some uncertainty about pθ (where θ ∈ {A,B}),
and we will capture this uncertainty facing individual i by his subjective probability
distribution denoted by Fiθ. Savage’s standard model is then the special case where Fiθ
is degenerate and puts probability 1 on some pˆiθ.
Consider any infinite sequence s ≡ {st}∞t=1 of signals and write S for the set of all
such sequences. The posterior belief of individual i about θ after observing the first n
signals {st}nt=1 is given by Bayes’s rule as
φin (s) ≡ Pi (θ = A | {st}nt=1) ,
where Pi (θ = A | {st}nt=1) denotes the posterior probability that θ = A given a sequence
of signals {st}nt=1 under prior pii and subjective probability distribution Fiθ. Since the
sequence of signals, s, is generated by an exchangeable process, the order of the signals
does not matter for the posterior. The latter only depends on
rn (s) ≡ # {t ≤ n|st = a} ,
i.e., on the number of times st = a out of the first n signals. By the strong law of large
numbers, rn (s) /n converges to some ρ (s) ∈ [0, 1] almost surely, for both individuals.
Defining the set
S¯ ≡ {s ∈ S : limn→∞ rn (s) /n exists} , (3)
this observation implies that Pi
(
s ∈ S¯) = 1 for i = 1, 2. We will often state our results
for all sample paths s in S¯, which equivalently implies that these statements are true
almost surely or with probability 1. Now, a straightforward application of the Bayes
rule gives
φin (s) =
1
1 + 1−pi
i
pii
Pi(rn|θ=B)
Pi(rn|θ=A)
, (4)
where Pi (rn|θ) is the probability of observing the signal st = a exactly rn times out of
n signals with respect to the distribution Fiθ.
The following theorem presents a slight generalization of the standard result, for
example, as formulated by Savage (1954).
Theorem 1 Assume that each Fiθ puts probability 1 on pˆθ for some pˆθ > 1/2, i.e.,
Fiθ (pˆθ) = 1 and Fiθ (p) = 0 for each p < pˆθ. Then, for each i = 1,2:
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1. There is asymptotic learning of the underlying state, in the sense that
Pi
(
limn→∞ φ
i
n (s) = 1|θ = A
)
= 1.
2. There is asymptotic agreement between the two agents, in the sense that
Pi
(
limn→∞
∣∣φ1n (s)− φ2n (s)∣∣ = 0) = 1.
This standard result states that when the individuals know the conditional distribu-
tions of the signals (and hence they agree what those distributions are), they will learn
the truth from experience and observation (almost surely as n→∞) and two individuals
observing the same sequence will necessarily come to agree what the underlying state, θ,
is. A simple intuition for this result is that the underlying state θ is fully identified from
the limiting frequencies, so that both individuals can infer the underlying state from the
observation of the limiting frequencies of signals.
However, there is more to this theorem than this simple intuition. Each individual is
sure that they will be confronted either with a limiting frequency of a signals equal to pˆA,
in which case they will conclude that θ = A, or they will observe a limiting frequency of
1− pˆB, and they will conclude that θ = B; and they attach zero probability to the events
that they will observe a different asymptotic frequency. What happens if an individual
observes a frequency ρ of signals different from pˆA and 1− pˆB in a large sample of size n?
The answer to this question will provide the intuition for some of the results that we will
present next. Observe that this event has zero probability under the individual’s beliefs
at the limit n = ∞. However, for n < ∞ he will assign a strictly positive (but small)
probability to such a frequency of signals resulting from sampling variation. Moreover,
it is straightforward to see that there exists a unique ρˆ (pˆA, pˆB) ∈ (1− pˆB, pˆA) such that
when ρ > ρˆ (pˆA, pˆB), the required sampling variation that leads to ρ under θ = B is
infinitely greater (as n→∞) than the one under θ = A. This cutoff value ρˆ (pA, pB) is
clearly the solution to the equation pρA (1− pA)1−ρ = p1−ρB (1− pB)ρ, given by
ρˆ (pA, pB) ≡ log (pB/ (1− pA))
log (pB/ (1− pA)) + log (pA/ (1− pB)) ∈ (1− pB, pA) . (5)
Consequently, when ρ > ρˆ (pˆA, pˆB), the individual will asymptotically assign probability
1 to the event that θ = A. Conversely, when ρ < ρˆ (pˆA, pˆB), he will assign probability 1
to θ = B.
Lack of Learning and Disagreement
It is clear that this theorem relies on the feature that Fiθ (1/2) = 0 for each i = 1,2 and
each θ. This implies that both individuals attach zero probability to a range of possible
models of the world—i.e., they are certain that pθ cannot be less than 1/2. There are
two reasons for considering situations in which this is not the case. First, the preceding
discussion illustrates why assigning zero probability to certain models of the world is
important; it enables individuals to ascribe any frequency of signals that are unlikely
under these models to sampling variability. This kind of inference may be viewed as
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somewhat unreasonable, since individuals are reaching very strong conclusions based on
events that have vanishingly small probabilities (since sampling variability vanishes as
n → ∞). Second, once we take into account uncertainty about the underlying models
that individuals have, it may also be natural to allow them to attach positive (albeit
small) probabilities to all possible values of pθ. This latter feature will lead to very
different consequences as shown by the next theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that for each i and θ, Fiθ has a continuous, non-zero and finite
density f iθ over [0, 1]. Then,
1. There is no asymptotic learning, i.e., Pi
(
limn→∞ φ
i
n (s) 6= 1|θ = A
)
= 1 for i = 1,2.
2. There is no asymptotic agreement between the two agents, i.e.,
Pi
(
limn→∞
∣∣φ1n (s)− φ2n (s)∣∣ 6= 0) = 1 whenever pi1 6= pi2 and F 1θ = F 2θ for
each θ ∈ {A,B}.
The proof of this theorem is given in Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007).
Let us also provide a brief sketch of the arguments leading to the main results of
no learning and asymptotic agreement. When Fiθ has a continuous, non-zero and finite
density f iθ over [0, 1], it can be shown that for s ∈ S¯,
φi∞ (ρ (s)) ≡ lim
n→∞
φin (s) =
1
1 + 1−pi
i
pii
Ri (ρ (s))
, (6)
where ρ (s) = limn→∞ rn (s) /n, and for all ρ ∈ [0, 1],
Ri (ρ) ≡ f
i
B (1− ρ)
f iA (ρ)
(7)
is the asymptotic likelihood ratio. From this result, one can prove Theorem 2 readily,
as Ri (ρ) does not vanish or diverge to infinity: any asymptotic frequency of different
signals can be generated both under θ = A and under θ = B. This implies that some
residual uncertainty will remain, and priors will be important in shaping asymptotic
beliefs.
In fact, in the presence of learning under this type of uncertainty, two Bayesian
agents may end up disagreeing more after receiving exactly the same infinite sequence
of signals—again a feature that it is never possible in the standard model (without
uncertainty). We state this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Suppose that for each i and θ, Fiθ has a continuous, non-zero and finite
density f iθ over [0, 1] and that there exists  > 0 such that |R1 (ρ)−R2 (ρ)| >  for each
ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, there exists an open set of priors pi1 and pi2, such that for all s ∈ S¯,
lim
n→∞
∣∣φ1n (s)− φ2n (s)∣∣ > ∣∣pi1 − pi2∣∣ ;
in particular,
Pi
(
lim
n→∞
∣∣φ1n (s)− φ2n (s)∣∣ > ∣∣pi1 − pi2∣∣) = 1.
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Intuitively, even a small difference in priors ensures that individuals will interpret
signals differently, and if the original disagreement is relatively small, after almost all se-
quences of signals, the disagreement between the two individuals grows. Consequently,
the observation of a common sequence of signals causes an initial difference of opin-
ion between individuals to widen (instead of the standard merging of opinions under
certainty). Theorem 3 also shows that both individuals are certain ex ante that their
posteriors will diverge after observing the same sequence of signals, because they under-
stand that they will interpret the signals differently. This result strengthens the general
message that under rich enough priors, Bayesian updating does not guarantee learning
or consensus. Instead, for some priors individuals will “agree to eventually disagree even
more”.
Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007) in fact establish a much stronger result:
agreement by two Bayesian agents is fragile in the sense that if we take the limit in the
above model such that Fiθ’s become Dirac (concentrated around single points), then even
though this limit is arbitrarily close to the standard case where asymptotic agreement
is guaranteed, Bayesian updating does not necessarily lead to agreement. In fact, there
necessarily exist some priors such that the limiting sequence of beliefs (as Fiθ’s become
Dirac) differs from limiting beliefs (which do involve consensus). These results, therefore,
strengthen the points already highlighted in this section that Bayesian updating gets
a lot of mileage by restricting priors. When these types of restrictions on priors are
reasonable and the cognitive requirements of Bayesian updating are not excessive in
terms of complex computations and reasoning, Bayesian approaches to learning may be
a natural starting point. Else, it may have more limited relevance for real world learning
problems.4
3 Bayesian Social Learning In Networks
In the previous section we saw how both Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches to opin-
ion formation have strengths and shortcomings. We therefore think that there is much
to learn from both types of approaches and from their contrast. In this and the next
section, we will outline several mathematical models of opinion formation and dynam-
ics. In this section, we focus on Bayesian models. We start with Bayesian models of
observational learning, meaning models in which individuals learn from the observation
of others’ actions. We then turn to models of communication learning, where individ-
uals learn through communication. In both cases our focus will be on interactions in
the context of relatively general social networks and on understanding what classes of
learning problems and what types of social networks will lead to “good outcomes,” that
is, to an equilibrium in which the social group will be able to aggregate the available
4See also Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008) on how common knowledge might fail to arise
from Bayesian observations (our discussion here emphasizes lack of common priors), and Gul (1998) for
another critique of the common priors.
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dispersed information. In the next section, we turn to non-Bayesian models.
We will summarize the relevant literature in the context of the models we present
below. But a high-level summary of the general lessons from these models is useful.
We will find that even in very simple environments, Bayesian learning need not lead
to the formation of accurate opinions and beliefs that aggregate all of the dispersed
information, though it does typically lead to consensus or “quasi-consensus” (meaning
only small differences in opinion remaining among the agents). The structure of the
network—which encodes information on such things as who observe whose actions and
who communicates with whom—influences opinion dynamics, though some of the effects
of network structure are on the speed of learning rather than on asymptotic outcomes,
and the analysis of speed of learning is much more challenging and is generally an open
question for future research.
3.1 Bayesian Observational Learning
We start with models of Bayesian learning from observations of past actions.
Problem
Consider the following problem first studied by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hir-
shleifer, and Welch (1992). A countably infinite number of agents (individuals), indexed
by n ∈ N, sequentially make a single decision each. The payoff of agent n depends on
an underlying, payoff-relevant state of the world, θ, and on her decision. Learning and
opinion formation in this society will be about θ.
Suppose, for simplicity, that both the underlying state and decisions are binary. In
particular, the decision of agent n is denoted by xn ∈ {0, 1} and the underlying state is
taken to be θ ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff of agent n is
un (xn, θ) =
{
1 if xn = θ
0 if xn 6= θ. (8)
To simplify notation, we assume that both values of the underlying state are equally
likely, so that P(θ = 0) = P(θ = 1) = 1/2.
As a specific example, θ = 1 might denote whether a particular product is high quality
or whether a certain line of business is profitable (but may also correspond to more
abstract issues such as whether a particular ideology provides the right perspective on
political, social or economic events). The variable x would then correspond to purchasing
or entry decisions (or to whether an individual subscribes to a certain ideology).
Assume also that each individual receives an independent binary signal s ∈ {0, 1}
such that s = θ has probability q > 1/2. The signals are private information and are thus
referred to as private signals. In addition, each individual observes all past actions (i.e.,
individual n observes all of x1,..., xn−1 in addition to sn). Since this is a dynamic game
of incomplete information, we focus on the standard equilibrium concept (weak) Perfect
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Bayesian Equilibrium, PBE, which simply requires that each individual chooses the ac-
tion that maximizes their utility given their beliefs and beliefs are formed by Bayesian
updating which correctly conditions on the equilibrium strategies of all other agents
(e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). There are two important features of this equilib-
rium concept, which are entirely standard in game theory: first, there will be Bayesian
updating (this is similar to the example of Bayesian updating we have already discussed
in the previous section). Second, again as we emphasized in the previous section, each
individual will understand and correctly condition on the equilibrium strategies of other
agents. The second feature, though simple, is quite important and subtle: individuals
will not simply look at what actions others choose, but will try to infer what their signals
must have been from their actions (based on their understanding or views about others’
strategies). This clearly requires more complex reasoning than just Bayesian updating.
The key result in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) and in Banerjee (1992)
is the following striking herding result. Focus on an equilibrium in which the first two
individuals choose the action in line with their signal (i.e., for n = 1, 2, xn = 1 if and
only if sn = 1). First observe that this behavior is in fact a PBE. Indeed, it is a strict
best response for the first agent to choose xn = sn given that the signals are informative
(q > 1/2) and the prior is that the two states are equally likely to start with. What
about the second agent? Suppose that she observes x1 = 1. Given the behavior of the
first agent (and here conditioning on the strategies of others is crucial), she can infer
perfectly that the first agent must have received a signal of s1 = 1. If in addition she
also receives a signal of s2 = 1, it is again a strict best response for her to choose x2 = 1.
What if she receives a signal of s2 = 0. Now given that she knows that s1 = 1 and
since s = θ has probability q > 1/2 regardless of the underlying state θ, the posterior of
this agent, defined as the probability that θ is equal to 1 given his information, will be
exactly the same as the initial prior, i.e., 1/2. Therefore, it is a weak best response for
her to choose x2 = 0 if s2 = 0. Thus we have verified that there exists a PBE in which
both of the first two agents follow their signals.
What about agent n = 3? She has observed x1 = x2 = 1 and suppose that she
receives a signal of s3 = 0. Conditioning on the equilibrium in which both agents 1
and 2 make choices in line with their signals, she knows (i.e., she can infer from their
behavior) that s1 = s2 = 1. She has effectively access to three signals s1 = s2 = 1 (from
the behavior of the first two agents) and her private signal, s3 = 0. But then, given
the signal structure, her posterior will be strictly less than the initial prior, 1/2, for any
q > 1/2. This means that even if s3 = 0, she will choose x3 = 1. Of course, if s3 = 1,
she will choose x3 = 1 a fortiori. Hence we have obtained the result that it is a strict
best response for her to herd on the behavior of the first two agents, entirely ignoring
her own information.5
What about agent n = 4? Again, conditioning correctly on others’ strategies, he will
5The same argument also shows that herding would occur even if agent 2 mixed between x2 = 0 and
x2 = 1 conditional on s2 = 0 and x1 = 1. Thus our specific selection of equilibrium does not affect the
conclusion.
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infer from x1 = x2 = 1 that s1 = s2 = 1, actual also understand that agent 3 has ignored
her information. But this means that he is in exactly the same situation as agent 3, and
in the same way as it was a strict best response for n = 3 to herd, it is a strict best
response for n = 4 to do so. By induction, the same conclusion applies to any n ≥ 4.
We have thus obtained the result that following x1 = x2 = 1, all agents will ignore their
private signals and they will all choose the same action, x = 1. Clearly, x1 = x2 = 1
is entirely consistent with θ = 0. In particular, it can happen with probability (1− q)2
when θ = 0, which can be quite close to 1/2. This implies that a mistaken herd, in
which all agents choose the incorrect action and there is almost no aggregation of the
dispersed private information, can happen with reasonably high probability (and it is
straightforward to see that a similar herd also arises if three of the first four agents, or
five of the first eight agents and so on, choose x = 1). This example therefore sharply
illustrates how dispersed information will fail to be aggregated even though all agents
would like to know this information and are all acting in a fairly sophisticated Bayesian
(and in fact game theoretic) manner. It is also important to emphasize another feature
here: it is no coincidence that a mistaken herd cannot happen with probability greater
than 1/2. Since agents are Bayesian and have the correct model of the world, their
beliefs at any point in time are “accurate,” meaning that if they believed the true state
to be θ = 1 with probability p, then this is indeed the probability that an outside
observer with access to exactly the same data would assign to the event that θ = 1.
But since individuals will only choose action x = 1 if they believe θ = 1 is more likely
than θ = 0, they can never be more likely to make a mistake than taking the correct
action. This fact, though simple, has important implications, particularly concerning
the possibility of misinformation and indoctrination. There will be limits to how much
misinformation and belief manipulation there can be in a Bayesian world, at least unless
we relax the assumption that individuals start with a reliable model of the world (e.g.,
with accurate priors). Motivated by this feature, in the next section we will use non-
Bayesian approaches to develop our benchmark models of spread of misinformation and
belief manipulation.
Related Literature
There is now a sizable literature building on the insights we have just discussed charac-
terizing the conditions under which there is aggregation of dispersed information through
a process of social learning. Most relevant for this subsection are the works focusing on
Bayesian updating, game theoretic analysis and observational learning. This literature is
also voluminous and includes, among others, the important work by Smith and Sørensen
(2000), who generalize the environment we have just outlined to include a richer set of
private signals. They define the notion of unbounded private signals, which will be intro-
duced below, and show that with unbounded private signals, which make it possible for
individuals to receive highly informative signals, the type of herding we just identified
does not happen. However, with bounded private signals, it is a robust phenomenon
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which necessarily occurs.
Welch (1992), Lee (1993), Chamley and Gale (1994), and Vives (1997) consider
various other extensions. These papers maintain the assumption that all past actions
are observed. Using language from the analysis of networks, we can say that they
focus on the full observation network topology. Two papers that have gone beyond this
“full observation network topology” are Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Smith and
Sørensen (1998). Both of these papers study social learning with random sampling of
past actions.
Thus much of the literature has not tackled the issue of learning taking place in
the context of a social network, where each individual only observes the actions of a
subset of the other agents (those with whom he is more connected through friendship,
work or other social engagements). We will next present the model and the analysis
from Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2009), which introduces a network struc-
ture to capture these interactions (as well as allowing more general signal structures).
Allowing for a network structure leads to several challenges. The first one is that, in
contrast to models with full observation network topology, one cannot use martingale
properties, which imply that the expectation of future beliefs conditional on publicly
available information is equal to current beliefs. The second is that the inference prob-
lem that individuals face is much more complex, because a given action might be driven
not by the private signals that an individual observes, but by the actions that they have
observed from the past (and we may be uncertain as to what these actions are or about
whether or not the individual in question has indeed observed others).
In the analysis that follows, we will maintain three assumptions that are worth high-
lighting. First, agents will be assumed to be Bayesian and understand the structure of
the game and the strategies of others. Relaxing this assumption is important and some
ways of doing so will be considered in the next section when we discuss non-Bayesian
models. Second, we will assume that there is no heterogeneity in the preferences of
the agents in this social network, i.e., they all have preferences given by (8). Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2010) extends this analysis to incorporate heterogeneity in
the preferences towards different types of actions. Finally, we will maintain the assump-
tion that each individual takes only a single decision. Repeated decisions introduce
additional challenges. The most important one of those is that agents will no longer
choose the action that maximizes their static payoff, but may choose to strategically
experiment in order to induce others to choose actions that will be more informative in
the future. The analysis of strategic experimentation is unfortunately very challenging.
Bala and Goyal (1998) and Gale and Kariv (2003) study models of social learning with
repeated interactions, but both of these of papers ignore the strategic experimentation
issue (Bala and Goyal (1998) in fact use a non-Bayesian model of learning, though their
approach has many parallels with Bayesian models).
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Learning in Social Networks
We now outline the model and the results from Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar
(2009). We continue to assume that the unknown state θ is binary, {0, 1} (and that
P(θ = 0) = P(θ = 1) = 1/2). Each agent n ∈ N still has utility given by (8) and
forms beliefs about this state from a private signal sn ∈ S (where S is a metric space
or simply a Euclidean space) and from his observation of the actions of other agents.
Conditional on the state of the world θ, the signals are independently generated according
to a probability measure Fθ. We refer to the pair of measures (F0,F1) as the signal
structure of the model. We assume that F0 and F1 are absolutely continuous with
respect to each other, which immediately implies that no signal is fully revealing about
the underlying state. We also assume that F0 and F1 are not identical, so that some
signals are informative.
As already indicated, in contrast to the rest of the literature on social learning dis-
cussed above, we assume that agents do not necessarily observe all previous actions.
Instead, they observe the actions of other agents according to the structure of a social
network. To introduce the notion of a social network, let us first define a neighbor-
hood.Each agent n observes the decisions of the agents in his (stochastically-generated)
neighborhood, denoted by B(n). Since agents can only observe actions taken previously,
B(n) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n−1}. Each neighborhood B(n) is generated according to an arbitrary
probability distribution Qn over the set of all subsets of {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. We impose
no special assumptions on the sequence of distributions {Qn}n∈N except that the draws
from each Qn are independent from each other for all n and from the realizations of
private signals. The sequence {Qn}n∈N is the network topology of the social network
formed by the agents. The network topology is common knowledge, whereas the real-
ized neighborhood B(n) and the private signal sn are the private information of agent n.
We say that {Qn}n∈N is a deterministic network topology if the probability distribution
Qn is a degenerate (Dirac) distribution for all n. Otherwise, {Qn}n∈N is a stochastic net-
work topology. A social network consists of a network topology {Qn}n∈N and a signal
structure (F0,F1).
Notice that our framework is general enough to nest the majority of social network
models studied in the literature, including the popular preferential attachment and small-
world network structures. For example, the preferential attachment model can be nested
by choosing a stochastic network topology {Qn}n∈N with a collection of subsets S1,...,Sk
of agents such that agents in S1 have a very high probability of being in each B (n),
those in S2 also have a high, but lower than the corresponding probability for those in
S1, of being in each B (n), and so on. The small-world network structure can be nested
by choosing a partition {Sj} of N such that for each n ∈ Sj, the probability that any
agent m in Sj with m < n is also in B (n) is very high, while the probability that an
agent m who is not in Sj is in B (n) is low but positive. More generally, any network
structure can be represented by a judicious choice of {Qn}n∈N provided that we keep
the assumption that the realizations of {Qn}n∈N are independent, which is adopted to
simplify the analysis. The independence assumption on the neighborhoods does not
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impose a restriction on the degree distribution (cardinality) of the agents nor on their
degree of clustering.
We next introduce the definitions of equilibrium and asymptotic learning, and we
provide a characterization of equilibrium strategies. In particular, we show that equi-
librium decision rules of individuals can be decomposed into two parts: one that only
depends on an individual’s private signal, and the other that is a function of the obser-
vations of past actions. We also show why a full characterization of individual decisions
is nontrivial and motivate an alternative proof technique, relying on developing bounds
on improvements in the probability of the correct decisions, that will be used in the rest
of our analysis.
Given the description above, it is evident that the information set In of agent n is
given by her signal sn, her neighborhood B(n), and all decisions of agents in B(n), that
is,
In = {sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)}. (9)
The set of all possible information sets of agent n is denoted by In. A strategy for
individual n is a mapping σn : In → {0, 1} that selects a decision for each possible
information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies σ = {σn}n∈N. We use
the standard notation σ−n = {σ1, . . . , σn−1, σn+1, . . .} to denote the strategies of all
agents other than n and also (σn, σ−n) for any n to denote the strategy profile σ. Given
a strategy profile σ, the sequence of decisions {xn}n∈N is a stochastic process and we
denote the measure generated by this stochastic process by Pσ.
Definition 1 A strategy profile σ∗ is a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of
this game of social learning if for each n ∈ N, σ∗n maximizes the expected payoff of agent
n given the strategies of other agents σ∗−n.
Given a strategy profile σ, the expected payoff of agent n from action xn = σn(In) is
simply Pσ(xn = θ | In). Therefore, for any equilibrium σ∗, we have
σ∗n(In) ∈ argmax
y∈{0,1}
P(y,σ∗−n)(y = θ | In). (10)
We denote the set of equilibria of the game by Σ∗. It is clear that Σ∗ is nonempty.
Given the sequence of strategies {σ∗1, . . . , σ∗n−1}, the maximization problem in (10) has a
solution for each agent n and each In ∈ In. Proceeding inductively, and choosing either
one of the actions in case of indifference determines an equilibrium.
Our main focus is whether equilibrium behavior will lead to information aggregation.
This is captured by the notion of asymptotic learning, which is introduced next.
Definition 2 Given a signal structure (F0,F1) and a network topology {Qn}n∈N, we
say that asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ if xn converges to θ in probability
(according to measure Pσ), that is,
lim
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) = 1.
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Notice that asymptotic learning requires that the probability of taking the correct
action converges to 1.6 Therefore, asymptotic learning will fail when, as the network
becomes large, the limit inferior of the probability of all individuals taking the correct
action is strictly less than 1. The following proposition characterizes optimal decisions
by (Bayesian) individuals as a function of their observations and signal. The proof of
this proposition, like the other ones in this subsection, is omitted and can be found in
Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2009).
Proposition 1 Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium of the game. Let In ∈ In be an information
set of agent n. Then, the decision of agent n, xn = σ(In), satisfies
xn =
{
1, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) + Pσ
(
θ = 1 | B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)
)
> 1,
0, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) + Pσ
(
θ = 1 | B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)
)
< 1,
and xn ∈ {0, 1} otherwise.
This proposition establishes an additive decomposition in the equilibrium decision
rule between the information obtained from the private signal of the individual and from
the observations of others’ actions (in his neighborhood). The next definition formally
distinguishes between the two components of an individual’s information.
Definition 3 We refer to the probability Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) as the private belief of agent n,
and the probability
Pσ
(
θ = 1
∣∣ B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)) ,
as the social belief of agent n.
Proposition 1 and Definition 3 imply that the equilibrium decision rule for agent
n ∈ N is equivalent to choosing xn = 1 when the sum of his private and social beliefs
is greater than 1. Consequently, the properties of private and social beliefs will shape
equilibrium learning behavior.
The private belief of an individual is a function of his private signal s ∈ S and is not
a function of the strategy profile σ since it does not depend on the decisions of other
agents. We represent probabilities that do not depend on the strategy profile by P. We
use the notation pn to represent the private belief of agent n, i.e.,
pn = P(θ = 1 | sn).
A straightforward application of Bayes’ Rule implies that for any n and any signal
sn ∈ S, the private belief pn of agent n is given by
pn =
(
1 +
dF0
dF1
(sn)
)−1
. (11)
6It is also clear that asymptotic learning is equivalent to the posterior beliefs converging to a distri-
bution putting probability 1 on the true state.
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We next define the support of a private belief. The support of private beliefs play a
key role in asymptotic learning behavior. Since the pn are identically distributed for all n
(which follows by the assumption that the private signals sn are identically distributed),
in the following we will use agent 1’s private belief p1 to define the support and the
conditional distributions of private beliefs,
Definition 4 The support of the private beliefs is the interval [β, β], where the end
points of the interval are given by
β = inf {r ∈ [0, 1] | P(p1 ≤ r) > 0}, and β = sup {r ∈ [0, 1] | P(p1 ≤ r) < 1}.
The signal structure has bounded private beliefs if β > 0 and β < 1 and unbounded
private beliefs if β = 1− β = 1.
When private beliefs are bounded, there is a maximum informativeness to any signal.
When they are unbounded, agents may receive arbitrarily strong signals favoring either
state (this follows from the assumption that (F0,F1) are absolutely continuous with
respect to each other).
The conditional distribution of private beliefs given the underlying state j ∈ {0, 1}
can be directly computed as
Gj(r) = P(p1 ≤ r | θ = j). (12)
The signal structure (F0,F1) can be equivalently represented by the corresponding pri-
vate belief distributions (G0,G1), and in what follows, it will typically be more conve-
nient to work with (G0,G1) rather than (F0,F1). It is straightforward to verify that
G0(r)/G1(r) is nonincreasing in r and G0(r)/G1(r) > 1 for all r ∈ (β, β).
We also introduce a key property of network topologies and signal structures that im-
pact asymptotic learning. Intuitively, for asymptotic learning to occur, the information
that each agent receives from other agents should not only come from a bounded subset
of agents. This property is established in the following definition. For this definition
and throughout the paper, if the set B(n) is empty, we set maxb∈B(n) b = 0.
Definition 5 The network topology has expanding observations if for all K ∈ N, we
have
lim
n→∞
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
= 0.
If the network topology does not satisfy this property, then we say it has nonexpanding
observations.
Recall that the neighborhood of agent n is a random variable B(n) (with values in the
set of subsets of {1, 2, ..., n−1}) and distributed according to Qn. Therefore, maxb∈B(n) b
is a random variable that takes values in {0, 1, ..., n − 1}. The expanding observations
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condition can be restated as the sequence of random variables {maxb∈B(n) b}n∈N converg-
ing to infinity in probability. Similarly, it follows from the preceding definition that the
network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only if there exists some K ∈ N
and some scalar  > 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
≥ .
An alternative restatement of this definition might clarify its meaning. Let us refer to
a finite set of individuals C as excessively influential if there exists a subsequence of
agents who, with probability uniformly bounded away from zero, observe the actions of
a subset of C. Then, the network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only
if there exists an excessively influential group of agents. Note also that if there is a
minimum amount of arrival of new information in the network, so that the probability
of an individual observing some other individual from the recent past goes to one as the
network becomes large, then the network topology will feature expanding observations.
This discussion therefore highlights that the requirement that a network topology has
expanding observations is quite mild and most social networks, including all of those
discussed above, satisfy this requirement.
Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2009) establish the following characteriza-
tion results for asymptotic learning by this social network (society) of agents.
Theorem 4 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has unbounded private beliefs and
the network topology {Qn}n∈N has expanding observations. Then, asymptotic learning
occurs in every equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗.
Theorem 5 There exists no equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ with asymptotic learning if either:
1. the network topology {Qn}n∈N has nonexpanding observations; or
2. the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs and the network topology
{Qn}n∈N satisfies one of the following three conditions:
(a) B(n) = {1, . . . , n− 1} for all n,
(b) |B(n)| ≤ 1 for all n, or
(c) there exists some constant M such that |B(n)| ≤M for all n and
lim
n→∞
max
b∈B(n)
b =∞ with probability 1.
Several points are worth noting. First, Theorem 4 is surprising. Each agent is solving
a complex updating problem, and may directly have access to a very limited amount
of information. For instance, an example of a network topology with expanding obser-
vations is one in which each agent observes only one other agent from the past (which
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may be some recent neighbor or somebody randomly drawn from those that have al-
ready acted). It might appear that the information transmitted by the action of this
one agent is quite limited; not only is this just a single agent rather than a collection of
many agents as much of the previous literature assumes, but also it will not be known
who this agent himself has observed from the past, and thus it is difficult to infer this
individual’s own signal from his action. The result in the theorem follows nonetheless
because of a form of an improvement principle, whereby each agent can do as well as
the one individual she observes by just copying him. In fact, with unbounded private
signals, she will strictly do better than copying him by following her signals when they
are “extreme”. This reasoning suggests that for any sequence of agents, expected payoffs
are strictly increasing along the sequence, which, combined with the expanding obser-
vations assumption, ensures that this improvement sequence will continue until there is
convergence to the right decision with probability 1, implying asymptotic learning. The
role of the unbounded private signals in this result is related to but different from that
in Smith and Sørensen (2000). In Smith and Sørensen, the social belief is a martingale,
and unbounded private signals ensure that this martingale cannot converge anywhere
but to the correct belief. Here, in contrast, the unbounded private belief ensures that
the above-mentioned improvement principle must be strict.
Second, first part of Theorem 5 shows that there are also several network structures
that preclude learning even with unbounded private signals. These are network struc-
tures in which there are excessively influential agents who are the only source of all of
the information for a non-trivial subset of society. While mathematically not surprising,
this result is still useful in highlighting that social learning of the underlying state, and
thus aggregation of dispersed information, is only possible if all but a trivial fraction of
the agents have access to new information, meaning information coming from “recent”
actions.
Third, Theorem 5 also shows that for many commonly-studied network topologies,
bounded private signals preclude learning of the underlying state. Note that bounded
private signals do not mean uninformative signals. The support
(
β, β
)
defined above
could be quite close to (0, 1). And there is always sufficient (dispersed) information to
reveal the underlying state θ when a sufficiently large number of agents are considered.
Therefore, the failure of the equilibrium to aggregate this dispersed information is not
a forgone conclusion. It is however the equilibrium outcome because each agent stops
using his own information, thus free riding on the information revealed by past actions,
before there is sufficient aggregation of dispersed information on the underlying state.
Thus there is a herding-related reason why social learning does not take place. This
is also the reason why in many situations with bounded private beliefs the equilibrium
not only involves lack of social learning, but also convergence to a consensus or more
appropriately to a quasi-consensus, whereby beliefs across individuals are very similar
(sufficiently similar so that they take the same action).
Fourth, Theorem 5 does not, however, state that social learning will necessarily fail
with bounded private signals. In fact, this is not true, and Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel,
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and Ozdaglar (2009) identify a range of network topologies where social learning takes
place even though the information structure may involve bounded private signals (and
there are other structures where social learning takes place in some equilibria but not
in others). In particular, Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2009) show that
in a class of stochastic network topologies where a subset of the agents do not receive
sufficient information from others and are thus forced to use their own signals and the
remaining agents observe individuals from this subset with sufficiently high probability,
social learning always takes place. This result illustrates the importance of the network
topology, and in fact its specific stochastic properties, for long-run learning outcomes.
Fifth, despite the just-mentioned result on learning with bounded private signals,
which illustrates how learning depends on the specific network topology, the network
topology appears relatively unimportant in Theorems 4 and 5, beyond the issue of ex-
panding vs. nonexpanding observations. This is to some degree a shortcoming of the
model, since informal intuition and some empirical work indicate that network interac-
tions are important for information dissemination. In fact, this shortcoming is in part
a consequence of our focus on long-run learning outcomes. It can be shown that the
speed of learning is very different between network structures that allow social learning
(with unbounded private signals). For example, when each individual observes only one
person from the past, the speed of learning is much greater when this person is a recent
neighbor than when he is chosen from the past (uniformly) randomly. Thus in this
context, network effects might exhibit themselves more in the speed of learning than on
whether there is learning asymptotically. However, a systematic analysis of the issue of
speed of learning in general networks is much more challenging.
Sixth, social networks play an important role in opinion formation in practice because
we tend to talk to people in our social network. This type of learning is not well captured
by observational models, and instead requires a model of communication. This will be
our next task.
Finally, returning to some of the themes raised in the previous section, Bayesian
updating here is quite complex. It requires not only a standard application of Bayes rule,
but also necessitates each individual to correctly conjecture what types of information
each agent he has observed will have received (e.g., which ones of the many past actions
as he observes, and which actions have the individuals observed by this agent observed
themselves, and so on). This observation highlights that models of Bayesian observation
learning in social networks might require a very high degree of sophistication from the
agents and suggests that incorporating some aspects of non-Bayesian updating in this
context might be necessary. This is a topic we will take up in Section 4.
3.2 Bayesian Communication Learning
Problem
Consider next a similar environment where information concerning an underlying state
θ is held dispersely and agents will make a decision on the basis of θ. However learning
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will not arise from observation of others’ actions, but through communication. The dif-
ficulty with information aggregation in models of observational learning resulted from
the selfish interests of the agents: they ignore their impact on others’ learning. With
communication, selfish interests are again a problem, but in a different way. If all of the
agents have common interests and could communicate costlessly and rapidly, we would
expect that information sharing would occur and this is the basis of Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem. There are two problems preventing this strong conclusions from emerging,
however. First, not all agents may have the same interests. If an agent suspects that
another one might try to mislead him or her, communication will be hampered. In the
game theory literature, this issue is typically addressed by using the so-called “cheap
talk” models first proposed by Crawford and Sobel (1982). In these models, a sender,
who has some information, will send a message to a receiver, who will use this infor-
mation to make a decision. The problem is that the sender and the receiver may have
different interests, and thus the sender might try to influence the receiver’s decision by
communicating incorrect information. Crawford and Sobel (1982), and the literature
that follows them, characterizes the amount of information that can be transmitted in
such an interaction (see, e.g., Farrell and Rabin (1996), Morgan and Stocken (2008),
and Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008)).
Second, communication, even without strategic interactions, is time-consuming. An
individual might prefer to make a decision sooner rather than later, even if this involves
receiving less information. But in doing so, the individual will also be affecting the
information that others obtain. Thus, selfish behavior, now in the form of trying to
reach a decision quickly, will again affect the information that is available to others in a
society or in a social network.
We next present a model based on Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2009) de-
signed to address these issues. The literature on learning by communication in groups
is somewhat smaller than the observational learning literature (there are several non-
Bayesian models of communication, which we will discuss in the next section). Most
closely related to the model we will present here are Galeotti, Ghiglino, Squintani (2010)
and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010), which look at one-shot cheap talk games superim-
posed over a network of interacting agents. Their main focus is on the conditions under
which there will be truthful communication in a given network. Though they represent
important advances in our understanding of the limits of communication in the context
of social groups and networks, these papers do not provide an analysis of the aggregation
of dispersed information, which is our focus here.
Model
We next study a simple model of learning with communication based on Acemoglu,
Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2009). We consider n agents situated in a communication
network represented by a directed graph Gn = (N n, En), where N n = {1, · · · , n} is the
set of agents and En is the set of directed edges with which agents are linked. Agents
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make decisions over time and the payoff to each agent depends on her decision and an
underlying unknown state of the world θ, which we assume to be binary, i.e., θ ∈ {0, 1}.
For simplicity, we again assume that both values of θ are equally likely, i.e., P(θ = 0) =
P(θ = 1) = 1/2.
Agent i forms beliefs about θ from a private signal si ∈ Si (where Si is a Euclidean
space), as well as from information she obtains from other agents through the network
Gn. At each time period, t = 0, 1, · · · , agent i can decide to take an irreversible action,
0 or 1, or wait for another time period. Her payoff is thus
uni (x
n
i , θ) =
{
δτpi if xni,τ = θ and x
n
i,t = “wait” for t < τ,
0 otherwise,
where xni = [x
n
i,t]t=0,1··· denotes the sequence of agent i’s actions (x
n
i,t ∈ {“wait”, 0, 1}).
Here, xni,t = 0 or 1 denotes agent i taking action 0 or 1 respectively, while “wait”
designates the agent deciding to wait for that time period without taking an action;
pi > 0 is the payoff from the correct action. Without loss of generality, we normalize pi
to be equal to 1. We say that the agent “exits”, if she chose to take action 0 or 1. The
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) implies that an earlier exit is preferred to a later one.
We say that agent i sends information (or a message) to agent j (or equivalently j
receives information from i) if there is an edge from i to j in graph Gn, i.e., (i, j) ∈ En.
Let Ini,t denote the information set of agent i at time t and Ini,t denote the set of all possi-
ble information sets. For any i, j, such that (i, j) ∈ En, the messages that i can send to j
at time t are defined through a mapping mnij,t : Ini,t →Mnij,t, whereMnij,t denotes the set
of all possible messages. This mapping makes it clear that the messages that i can send
to j could in principle depend on the information set of agent i as well as the identity of
agent j. Importantly, we assume that the cardinality (“dimensionality”) of Mnij,t is no
less than that of Ini,t, so that communication can take the form of agent i sharing all her
information with agent j. This has two key implications. First, an agent can commu-
nicate (indirectly) with a much larger set of agents than just her immediate neighbors,
albeit with a time delay. As an example, an agent can communicate with the neighbors
of her neighbors in two time periods (see Figure 1). Second, mechanical duplication of
information is avoided. For example, the second time agent j communicates with agent
i, she can repeat her original signal, but this will not be recorded as an additional piece
of information by agent j, since given the size of the message space Mnij,t, each piece
of information can be “tagged”. This ensures that under truthful communication, there
need be no confounding of new information and previously communicated information.
The information set of agent i at time t ≥ 1 is given by
Ini,t = {si,mnji,τ , for all 1 ≤ τ < t and j such that (j, i) ∈ En}
and Ini,0 = {si}. In particular, the information set of agent i at time t ≥ 1 consists of
her private signal and all the messages her neighbors sent to i in previous time periods.
Agent i’s action xni,t at time t is a mapping from her information set to the set of actions,
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Figure 1: The information set of Agent 1 under truthful communication.
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i.e.,
σni,t : Ini,t → {“wait”, 0, 1}.
The tradeoff between taking an action (0 or 1) and waiting, should be clear at this
point. An agent would wait, in order to communicate with a larger set of agents and
potentially choose the correct action with higher probability. On the other hand, the
future is discounted, therefore, delaying is costly. Moreover, an agent may delay her
decision so that other agents, whom she receives information from, delay their exit
decisions. These strategic considerations introduce a game among the agents, which we
refer to as the information exchange game.
We will need the notion of the neighborhood of an agent in the following analysis.
In particular, the neighborhood of agent i at time t is defined as
Bni,t = {j 6= i | ∃ a directed path from j to i with at most t links in Gn},
i.e., Bni,t consists of all agents that are at most t links away from agent i in graph G
n.
Intuitively, if agent i waits for t periods and all of the intervening agents receive and
send information truthfully, i will have access to all of the signals of the agents in the
set Bni,t.
We next define the equilibria of the information exchange game.7
Definition 6 An action strategy profile σn,∗ is a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium of the information exchange game if for every i ∈ N n and time t, σn,∗i,t maximizes
the expected payoff of agent i given the strategies of other agents σn,∗−i , i.e.,
σn,∗i,t ∈ arg max
y∈{“wait”,0,1}
E((y,σn,∗i,−t),σn,∗−i )
(
ui(x
n
i , θ)|Ini,t
)
.
Let us consider a sequence of communication networks {Gn}∞n=1 and refer to it as a
society. We use the term equilibrium to denote a sequence of equilibria σ = {σn}∞n=1
of information exchange games. The next definition introduces asymptotic learning for
a given society. For any fixed n ≥ 1 and any equilibrium of the information exchange
game σn, we introduce the indicator variable:
Mni,t =
{
1 if agent i takes the correct decision by time t,
0 otherwise.
(13)
Definition 7 We say that asymptotic learning occurs in society {Gn}∞n=1 along equilib-
rium σ if for every  > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
lim
t→∞
Pσ
([
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
1−Mni,t
)]

)
= 0.
7Note that σni,−t denotes the vector of actions of agent i at all times except t.
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This definition states that asymptotic learning occurs with all but a negligible fraction
of the agents taking the correct action (as the society grows infinitely large).
Let us also simplify the analysis and the exposition by assuming that private signals
are binary. In particular, we assume that si ∈ {0, 1} for all i. Let L(x) denote the
likelihood ratio for private signal x, i.e., L(x) = P(x|θ=1)P(x|θ=0) . We assume that L(1) =
β
1−β
and L(0) = 1−β
β
(with 1/2 > β). Moreover, the (common) precision of the private signals
β is taken to be less than the discount factor δ, i.e., β < δ. We will also further simplify
the analysis by assuming that communication is truthful (thus, until she exists, an agent
truthfully reports all of her information). These results are extended to the case with
strategic communication in Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2009).
We next introduce the concepts that are instrumental for asymptotic learning: the
minimum observation radius and k-radius sets. We define the minimum observation
radius of agent i as the following stopping time:
Definition 8 The minimum observation radius of agent i is defined as dni , where
dni = arg min
t
min
Ini,t∈{0,1}
|In
i,t
|
{
xn,∗i,t (I
n
i,t) ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
In particular, the minimum observation radius of agent i can be simply interpreted
as the minimum number of time periods that agent i will wait before she takes an
irreversible action 0 or 1, given that all other agents do not exit, over any possible
realization of the private signals. Given the notion of a minimum observation radius, we
define k-radius sets as follows.
Definition 9 Let V nk be defined as
V nk = {i ∈ N
∣∣ ∣∣Bni,dni ∣∣ ≤ k}.
We refer to V nk as the k-radius set.
Intuitively, V nk includes all agents that may take an action before they receive signals
from more than k other individuals—the size of their (indirect) neighborhood by the
time their minimum observation radius dni is reached is no greater than k. Equivalently,
agent i belongs to set V nk if the number of agents that lie at distance less than d
n
i from
i are at most k. From Definition 9 it follows immediately that
i ∈ V nk ⇒ i ∈ V nk′ for all k′ > k. (14)
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic
learning to occur in a society under the assumption that communication is truthful.
Theorem 6 Suppose communication is truthful. Then, asymptotic learning occurs in
society {Gn}∞n=1 (in any equilibrium σ) if and only if
lim
k→∞
lim
n→∞
1
n
· ∣∣V nk ∣∣ = 0. (15)
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This result states that asymptotic learning is precluded if there exists a significant
fraction of the society that will take an action before seeing a large set of signals, because
in this case there will be a positive probability of each individual making a mistake, since
her decision is based on a small set of signals. Intuitively, this condition requires that
most agents are a short distance away from information hubs, defined as agents that
have a very large (in the limit, infinite) number of connections. This motivates two
different types of information hubs as conduits of asymptotic learning (both of these
labels are inspired by Gladwell (2000)). The first are information mavens, which have
a large in-degree, enabling them to aggregate information. If most agents are close to
an information maven, asymptotic learning is guaranteed. The second type of hubs
are social connectors, which have large out-degree, enabling them to communicate their
information to a large number of agents. Social connectors are only useful for asymptotic
learning if they are close to mavens, so that they can distribute their information. Thus,
asymptotic learning is also obtained if most agents are close to a social connector, who
is in turn a short distance away from a maven.
In Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (2009), we study an environment, in which
individuals may (strategically) misreport their information if they have an incentive to
do so. We show that individuals may in general choose to misreport their information in
order to delay the action of their neighbors, thus obtaining more information from them
in the future. Nevertheless, we establish that whenever truthful communication leads to
asymptotic learning, it is an -equilibrium of the strategic communication game to report
truthfully. Interestingly, the converse is not necessarily true: strategic communication
may lead to asymptotic learning in some special cases in which truthful communication
precludes learning.
The most important implication of this analysis is that even if truthful communica-
tion can be guaranteed, the conditions for learning are quite stringent. In particular,
Theorem 6 shows that such learning will only take place when there are mavens and
social connectors that can effectively aggregate almost all of the dispersed information.
While this might sometimes be a good approximation to media sources or other central
individuals that play the role of information aggregation in society, it does not provide
a good description of most social networks and societies, where information flows are
much more local. What happens when the dispersed information cannot be aggregated
through communication? Because the underlying model here corresponds to a strongly
connected network, even when all of the dispersed information cannot be aggregated,
there are strong forces here towards consensus. In particular, a common situation would
be one in which highly-connected individuals will not wait for all of the possible in-
formation that they can gather, because of the cost of delay, and will instead make a
decision at some point. But since they are highly connected, this choice will be observed
by others and will influence their beliefs. Because there will be no more information
forthcoming from these individuals, in most situations the rest of the society might also
immediately follow the actions of these highly connected individuals. In this situation,
even though all individuals may not hold exactly the same beliefs, they will still have
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beliefs that are very similar, and in particular, they will all choose the same action.
Therefore, there will be a form of “herding” in this environment as well, now based
on (partially informative) communication rather than observation of past actions. The
reason why this information does not aggregate is therefore not a lack of consensus, but
rather the fact that consensus forms too soon.
This discussion therefore highlights that both in Bayesian models of observational
learning and communication, there are reasons to expect opinions not to effectively ag-
gregate dispersed information, though the result will often be some type of consensus.
Therefore, Bayesian models highlight the difficulties of aggregating dispersed informa-
tion, while also emphasizing that it is rare for individuals observing each others’ actions
or communicating together to arrive at very different beliefs.8
3.3 Learning in Markets
Even though the underlying state θ may be related to economic decisions, the models
we have discussed so far allow for social and economic interactions but not for market-
based interactions. A different perspective, pioneered by the famous economist Frederich
von Hayek, also argues that dispersed information can be aggregated effectively through
markets, instead of through individuals’ observation of and communication with their
network. Hayek reached a similar conclusion to that of Galton on the collective intelli-
gence of groups because he argued that markets and prices were effective at aggregating
dispersed information. For example, Hayek wrote (1945, p. 526):
“The mere fact that there is a one [market] price for any commodity...
brings about the solution which... might have been arrived at by one single
mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all
people involved in the process.”
Hayek in fact believed that while markets could successfully aggregate dispersedly-
held complex information, no single individual or government could play the same role
because the cost of computation and processing it would be prohibitive. Thus in Hayek’s
vision, social learning mediated by the market is superior to what a centralized authority
could achieve even if it had access to the same information.
The economics literature has attempted to construct models to formalize this per-
spective. One approach has been to augment the standard Arrow-Debreu competitive
equilibrium analysis with dispersed information. The key assumption is that while each
individual might have dispersed and even private information, he still behaves in a com-
petitive manner, as a price taker, meaning he takes prices as fixed and independent of
his actions (e.g., Radner (1972, 1982), Grossman (1977) and Allen (1981)). Under some
(sometimes quite stringent) assumptions, this approach shows that market prices might
8As we saw in the previous section, this type of differences in long-run beliefs can arise when there
is more uncertainty about the underlying state and the process through which signals are generated.
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effectively aggregate all the relevant information. This is a striking result, though there
are several challenges in mapping it to reality.
First, the result follows only when in the full information case (after dispersed infor-
mation has been effectively aggregated), there is a one-to-one mapping between observed
prices and the underlying state θ. This may not be the case in many situations, partic-
ularly if the underlying state θ has a high dimension.
Second, as noted by the seminal paper by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), if all infor-
mation is reflected in prices, then there may not be incentives for individuals to acquire
information, and this may lead to the disappearance (or nonexistence) of this type of
fully-revealing equilibrium.
Third and perhaps most important, this entire approach has been based on the com-
petitive equilibrium framework, and requires a Walrasian auctioneer to do the price set-
ting and adjustment. This is particularly important, since full revelation arises because
individuals can submit fully contingent demands to the Walrasian auctioneer. Hayek’s
intuition, in contrast, is based on decentralized trading. In fact, as we have emphasized,
Hayek believed that markets were achieving something that a central authority with all
of this information in its hands could not. Therefore, a systematic investigation of the
role of markets in social learning requires more microfounded models, where trade takes
place in a decentralized manner, possibly over a social network rather than in a central-
ized Walrasian market. It would also be necessary to investigate interactions between
non-market learning and information revealed by prices in markets.9
4 Non-Bayesian Learning
In this section, we present non-Bayesian models of belief formation with learning through
communication and show that the forces towards the emergence of incorrect beliefs in
the long run are even stronger. We first present a classical model introduced in De-
Groot (1974), which is a simple model of belief and consensus formation over social
networks (see also DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003), and Golub and Jackson,
(2009, 2010)).10 We will see, however, that the specific assumptions it makes on how be-
liefs are updated may have certain non-desirable implications. Motivated by this, we will
consider a variant of this model that avoids some of these properties and will then enrich
it by introducing issues related to the spread of misinformation, belief manipulation and
persistent disagreements between agents.
9Wolinsky (1990), Ostrovsky (2009) and Golosov, Lorenzoni and Tsyvinski (2009) investigate the
revelation of information by prices in markets in which buyers and sellers match and bargain over prices.
10The DeGroot model and variations have also been studied extensively in the cooperative control
literature as natural algorithms for achieving cooperative behavior with local information in networked-
systems (see Tsitsiklis (1984), Tsitsiklis, Bertsekas, and Athans (1986), Jadbabaie, Lin, and Morse
(2003), Olshevsky and Tsitsiklis (2009), Nedic and Ozdaglar (2009), Boyd, Gosh, Prabhakar, and Shah
(2005), Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2008), Fagnani and Zampieri (2009), and Lobel and Ozdaglar
(2010)).
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4.1 DeGroot Model of Belief Updating
We consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents interacting in a social network. Each agent
i starts with an initial belief about an underlying state, which we denote by xi(0) ∈ R.
Agents exchange information about their beliefs with their neighbors. We assume that
agents update their beliefs at discrete time instances. At any time k ≥ 0, agent i updates
his belief according to the relation
xi(k + 1) =
n∑
j=1
Tijxj(k). (16)
Here the nonnegative scalar Tij indicates the weight that agent i puts on agent j’s belief.
Letting x(k) = [x1(k), . . . , xn(k)]
′ denote the vector of beliefs, the evolution of the beliefs
can be expressed as
x(k + 1) = Tx(k) for all k ≥ 0,
where the weight matrix T = [Tij]i,j∈N represents the social network of interactions,
i.e., Tij = 0 implies that agent i does not get direct information from agent j regarding
his belief, or equivalently, there is no directed link from agent i to j in the underlying
social network.11 We assume that the weight matrix T is a (row) stochastic matrix, i.e.,
the sum of entries across each row is equal to one. Hence, at each time instance agents
update their beliefs to a convex combination of their current beliefs and the beliefs of
their neighbors.12
This is a simple update rule, capturing the “imitation” aspect of non-Bayesian models
we discussed in Section 2. When we think of a one-step update, this rule is also quite
11The appealing interpretation is that this type of averaging would be optimal at time t=0 if all
agents had independent beliefs drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to the underlying
state and weights adjusted according to the precision of the distribution. At times t > 0, the weights
assigned to the neighbors need to be updated to account for the new information they obtained from
their neighbors. Therefore, this type of updating can be viewed as a boundedly rational version of the
optimal processing of information where the weights are kept constant over time. This interpretation
is discussed in detail in De Marzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) in a related context.
12The literature has also considered versions of the DeGroot model with time varying weights and
belief-dependent weights (the weight matrix T is a function of agent beliefs x(k)). Time varying weights
have been studied both in social models of belief formation and in the cooperative control literature
and capture the natural setting in which an individual changes self and/or neighbor weights as he
gets more information or as the underlying network of interactions changes over time. Belief-dependent
weights represent situations in which the underlying communication patterns are affected by the current
beliefs of agents. A natural belief-dependent weight model is due to Krause (2000), which allows an
agent to pay attention to beliefs that do not differ too much from his own (see also Hegselmann and
Krause (2002), Deffuant, Neau, Amblard, and Weisbuch (2000) and Weisbuch, Kirman, and Herreiner
(2000)). The convergence of beliefs in these models is studied in Lorenz (2005), which under mild
conditions on the weight matrix T (x(k)), shows that the set of agents can be partitioned into groups
such that each group reaches a consensus (see also Blondel, Hendrickx, and Tsitsiklis (2009) for a proof
of convergence on Krause’s model and properties of limiting beliefs, and Lobel, Ozdaglar, and Feijer
(2010) for application of a belief-dependent communication model within a multi-agent optimization
framework).
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reasonable. For example, the entries of the matrix T can be interpreted as the trust that
an individual places on another (with Tij = 0 corresponding to the case in which agent i
does not trust j), and it may appear natural that an individual should update her beliefs
to be closer to those of the agents whom she trusts. However, when this update rule is
applied dynamically, it may not be as compelling. To see this, note that an individual
will update her beliefs at each date according to the beliefs of the agents that she trusts.
Take a special case in which Tij > 0 (agent i trusts agent j) and Tjk = 0 for all k 6= j, so
that agent j does not update her beliefs. In this situation, after the first period, agent
i has already taken all the relevant information from j. But according to the DeGroot
update rule, she will keep on updating her own information according to the unchanging
information of agent j, creating an extreme form of duplication of information. In
most practical situations, we would imagine that after repeated interactions, agent i
should realize that agent j has an unchanging opinion and there is no more point in
updating her views because of agent j’s different beliefs. While this special case is
extreme (because agent j’s opinions are not changing), it illustrates a general feature that
the DeGroot update rule might be too myopic, especially in the context of individuals
that are interacting in the same manner in each period.
The attractive feature of this model, on the other hand, is that the analysis of
consensus is quite straightforward. In particular, standard results from Markov Chain
Theory can be used to establish sufficient conditions that ensure convergence of the
beliefs to a stationary distribution, which here will represent consensus among all of the
agents, i.e., there will exist x¯ ∈ R such that x(k) converges to e′x¯ as k goes to infinity,
where e is the vector of all ones. This is because the matrix T has been assumed to
be a (row) stochastic matrix as noted above (this feature ensures that the stationary
distribution can be represented as e′x¯).
In particular, it can be shown that if the weight matrix T is such that the Markov
chain with transition matrix T is irreducible and aperiodic, then agent beliefs reach
a consensus in the limit. The irreducibility of the Markov chain is equivalent to the
underlying social network being strongly connected so that there is a directed path
from every node to every other node. Most of the literature in this area guarantees
aperiodicity by assuming that Tii > 0 for some or all i so that some or all agents assign
positive weight to their own belief in the update relation (16).13
This discussion also implies that consensus will arise under fairly weak assumptions
in this model (in particular, to avoid consensus, one needs to assume that the society
is not “strongly connected,” meaning that there is no communication between two or
more subsets, which would not be a realistic description of any society, however frag-
mented). Therefore, certain aspects of this model need to be generalized for the study
of persistent disagreements, the spread of misinformation and belief manipulation. In
the next subsection, we will present a variant of this model, which deals with several of
these problems.
13It is not necessary to have Tii > 0 for even a single i to ensure consensus. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for reaching a consensus in this model are presented in Golub and Jackson (2007).
38
4.2 Spread of Misinformation
We next consider a variation on the DeGroot model, developed in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar,
and ParandehGheibi (2009), which enables us to study the effect of prominent agents
on the beliefs of the society. We consider a similar setup as in the previous section
with a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents interacting over a social network with initial beliefs
xi(0) ∈ R about some underlying state θ ∈ R. We assume, in a way that parallels the
assumptions in the Bayesian models, that there is sufficient information about θ held in
a dispersed manner among all of the agents in the society. In particular, let us suppose
that the average of initial beliefs in the society is equal to θ, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0) = θ.
We also assume that there are two types of agents; regular and forceful. Regular
agents exchange information with their neighbors (when they meet). In contrast, forceful
agents influence others disproportionately.
We use an asynchronous continuous-time model to represent meetings between
agents. In particular, we assume that each agent meets and communicates with other
agents at instances defined by a rate one Poisson process independent of other agents.
This implies that the meeting instances (over all agents) occur according to a rate n
Poisson process at times tk, k ≥ 1. Note that in this model, by convention, at most one
node is active (i.e., is meeting another) at a given time. We discretize time according to
meeting instances (since these are the relevant instances at which the beliefs change),
and refer to the interval [tk, tk+1) as the k
th time slot. On average, there are n meeting
instances per unit of absolute time. Suppose that at time (slot) k, agent i is chosen to
meet another agent (probability 1/n). In this case, agent i will meet agent j ∈ N with
probability pij ≥ 0 (we assume that
∑n
j=1 pij = 1 for all i). We let P denote the matrix
with entries pij, which is again a (row) stochastic matrix.
14
Following a meeting between i and j, there is a potential exchange of information.
Throughout, we assume that all events that happen in a meeting are independent of
any other event that happened in the past. Let xi(k) denote the belief of agent i about
the underlying state at time k. The agents update their beliefs according to one of the
following three possibilities.
(i) Agents i and j reach pairwise consensus and the beliefs are updated according to
xi(k + 1) = xj(k + 1) =
xi(k) + xj(k)
2
.
We denote the conditional probability of this event (conditional on i meeting j)
as βij.
14There is a natural parallel between the matrix T indeed DeGroot model and the matrix P here.
However, we will see that it will in fact be an augmented version of this matrix that will play a
mathematically similar role to that of T into the DeGroot model.
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(ii) Agent j influences agent i, in which case for some  ∈ (0, 1/2], beliefs change
according to
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + (1− )xj(k), and xj(k + 1) = xj(k). (17)
In this case beliefs of agent j do not change.15 We denote the conditional prob-
ability of this event as αij, and refer to it as the influence probability. Note that
we allow  = 1/2, so that agent i may be treating agent j just as a regular agent,
except that agent j himself does not change his beliefs.
(iii) Agents i and j do not agree and stick to their beliefs, i.e.,
xi(k + 1) = xi(k), and xj(k + 1) = xj(k).
This event has probability γij = 1− βij − αij.
The first advantage of this framework is that the problem of duplication of infor-
mation highlighted in the context of the DeGroot model, though still present, is now
less severe. In particular, ignoring the events in which one agent influences the other
(events with probability αij described in (ii) above), two agents who match again after
having communicated in the recent past will have either reached a consensus or will not
have exchanged any information, and thus one more round of updating is either incon-
sequential or would not run into the problem that there is duplication of information.
There will be communication, instead, if one of them has met with somebody else and
has updated her beliefs in the process, and in this case, there is relevant information to
be exchanged, though there will still be some amount of replication of information.
The second advantage is that we can introduce, in a natural way, the possibility that
some agents are “prominent” and influence others, without themselves being influenced
to the same degree. This will then enable us to model some agents trying to manipulate
the beliefs of others or spreading misinformation. In particular, our description above
makes it clear that when αij > 0 agent j will have a special influence on agent i. To
emphasize this, any agent j for whom the influence probability αij > 0 for some i ∈ N
is referred to as a forceful agent. Moreover, the directed link (j, i) is referred to as a
forceful link.16
We can interpret forceful agents in multiple different ways. First, forceful agents may
correspond to community leaders or news media, who have a disproportionate effect on
the beliefs of their followers. In such cases, it is natural to consider  small and the
leaders or media not updating their own beliefs as a result of others listening to their
opinion. Second, forceful agents may be indistinguishable from regular agents, and thus
regular agents engage in what they think is information exchange, but forceful agents,
15We could allow the own-belief weight  to be different for each agent i. This generality does not
change the results or the economic intuitions, so for notational convenience, we assume this weight to
be the same across all agents.
16We refer to directed links/edges as links and undirected ones as edges.
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because of stubbornness or some other motive, do not incorporate the information of
these agents in their own beliefs. In this case, it may be natural to think of  as equal
to 1/2. The results that follow remain valid with either interpretation.
The influence structure described above will determine the evolution of beliefs in
the society. Below, we will give a more precise separation of this evolution into two
components, one related to the underlying social network, and the other to influence
patterns.
We next state our assumptions on the belief evolution model among the agents. Our
first assumption is about the connectivity of the agents in the social network. Consider
the directed graph (N , E), where E is the set of directed links induced by the positive
meeting probabilities pij, i.e.,
E = {(i, j) | pij > 0}. (18)
We assume that the graph (N , E) is strongly connected, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N , there exists
a directed path connecting i to j with links in the set E. This assumption ensures that
every agent “communicates” with every other agent (possibly through multiple links).
This is not an innocuous assumption, since otherwise the graph (N , E) (and the society
that it represents) would segment into multiple non-communicating parts. Though not
innocuous, this assumption is also natural for two reasons. First, the evidence suggests
that most subsets of the society are not only connected, but are connected by means
of several links (e.g., Watts (2003), Jackson (2008)), and the same seems to be true
for indirect linkages via the Internet. Second, if the society is segmented into multiple
non-communicating parts, the insights here would apply, with some modifications, to
each of these parts.
Let us also use dij to denote the length of the shortest path from i to j and d to
denote the maximum shortest path length between any i, j ∈ N , i.e.,
d = max
i,j∈N
dij. (19)
Since (N , E) is strongly connected, these are all well-defined. Finally, we also impose the
following no man is an island assumption, that there is positive probability that every
agent (even if he is forceful) receives some information from an agent in his neighborhood.
In particular, for all (i, j) ∈E , the sum of the averaging probability βij and the influence
probability αij is positive, i.e.,
βij + αij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E .
The assumption that the network is strongly connected ensures that there is a path from
any forceful agent to other agents in the network, implying that for any forceful agent
i, there is a link (i, j) ∈ E for some j ∈ N . Then the no man is an island assumption
guarantees that even the forceful agents at some point adopt information from the other
41
agents in the network.17 This is a central assumption for the analysis in this subsection,
and we will see in the next subsection that the implications of the model are enriched
considerably (though the analysis also becomes more involved) when this assumption is
relaxed.
We can express the preceding belief update model compactly as follows. Let x(k) =
(x1(k), . . . , xn(k)) denote the vector of agent beliefs at time k. The agent beliefs are
updated according to the relation
x(k + 1) = W (k)x(k), (20)
where W (k) is a random matrix given by
W (k) =
 A
ij ≡ I − (ei−ej)(ei−ej)′
2
with probability pijβij/n,
J ij ≡ I − (1− )ei(ei − ej)′ with probability pijαij/n,
I with probability pijγij/n,
(21)
for all i, j ∈ N . The preceding belief update model implies that the matrix W (k) is a
stochastic matrix for all k, and is independent and identically distributed over all k.
Given our assumptions, we have for some nonnegative matrix W˜ ,
E[W (k)] = W˜ for all k ≥ 0. (22)
The matrix, W˜ , which we refer to as the mean interaction matrix, represents the evolu-
tion of beliefs in the society. It incorporates elements from both the underlying social
network (which determines the meeting patterns) and the influence structure. In what
follows, it will be useful to separate these into two components, both for our mathemat-
ical analysis and to clarify the intuitions. For this purpose, let us use the belief update
model (20)-(21) and write the mean interaction matrix W˜ as follows:18
W˜ =
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
βijA
ij + αijJ
ij + γijI
]
=
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
(1− γij)Aij + γijI
]
+
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαij
[
J ij − Aij],
where Aij and J ij are matrices defined in equation (21), and the second equality follows
from the fact that βij = 1− αij − γij for all i, j ∈ N . We use the notation
T =
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
(1− γij)Aij + γijI
]
, D =
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαij
[
J ij − Aij], (23)
17This assumption is stated for all (i, j) ∈ E , thus a forceful agent i receives some information from
any j in his “neighborhood”. This is without any loss of generality, since we can always set pij = 0 for
those j’s that are in i’s neighborhood but from whom i never obtains information.
18In the sequel, the notation
∑
i,j will be used to denote the double sum
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1.
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to write the mean interaction matrix, W˜ , as
W˜ = T +D. (24)
Here, the symmetric matrix T only depends on meeting probabilities (matrix P )
and on the probability that following a meeting no exchange takes place, γij. We can
therefore think of the matrix T as representing the underlying social network (friend-
ships, communication among coworkers, decisions about which news outlets to watch,
etc.), and refer to it as the social network matrix. It will be useful below to represent
the social interactions using an undirected (and weighted) graph induced by the social
network matrix T . This graph is given by (N ,A), where A is the set of undirected edges
given by
A =
{
{i, j} | Tij > 0
}
, (25)
and the weight we of edge e = {i, j} is given by the entry Tij = Tji of the matrix T . We
refer to this graph as the social network graph.
The matrix D, on the other hand, can be thought of as representing the influence
structure in the society, and is hence called the influence matrix. It incorporates infor-
mation about which individuals and links are forceful, i.e., which types of interactions
will lead to one individual influencing the other without updating his own beliefs. It is
also useful to note for interpreting the mathematical results below that T is a doubly
stochastic matrix, while D is not. Therefore, equation (24) gives a decomposition of the
mean connectivity matrix W˜ into a doubly stochastic and a remainder component, and
enables us to use tools from matrix perturbation theory.
The next result shows that (stochastic) consensus will emerge despite the possibility
of misinformation and stochastic communication. We refer to this as stochastic consensus
because the consensus value of beliefs itself is a random variable that depends on the
initial beliefs and the random sequence of matrices {W (k)}.
Theorem 7 The sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N , generated by equation (20) converge to a
consensus belief, i.e., there exists a scalar random variable x¯ such that
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = x¯ for all i with probability one.
Moreover, the random variable x¯ is a convex combination of initial agent beliefs, i.e.,
x¯ =
n∑
j=1
pijxj(0),
where pi = [pi1, . . . , pin] is a random vector that does not depend on the initial beliefs, and
satisfies pij ≥ 0 for all j, and
∑n
j=1 pij = 1.
The key implication of this result is that, despite the presence of forceful agents,
the society will ultimately reach a consensus. Though surprising at first, this result is
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intuitive in light of our no man is an island assumption. Note however that, in contrast
to the DeGroot model discussed in the previous subsection, this consensus value here is
a random variable even conditional on initial beliefs. In particular, the consensus value
will depend on the order in which meetings have taken place. The main role of this
result for us is that we can now conduct our analysis on quantifying the extent of the
spread of misinformation by looking at this consensus value of beliefs.
The next theorem characterizes E[x¯] in terms of the limiting behavior of the matrices
W˜ k as k goes to infinity.
Theorem 8 Let x¯ be the limiting random variable of the sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N
generated by equation (20) (cf. Theorem 7). Then we have:
(a) The matrix W˜ k converges to a stochastic matrix with identical rows p¯i as k goes to
infinity, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
W˜ k = ep¯i′.
(b) The expected value of x¯ is given by a convex combination of the initial agent values
xi(0), where the weights are given by the components of the probability vector p¯i,
i.e.,
E[x¯] =
n∑
i=1
p¯iixi(0) = p¯i
′x(0).
Combining Theorem 7 and Theorem 8(a) (and using the fact that the results hold for
any x(0)), we have p¯i = E[pi]. The stationary distribution p¯i is crucial in understanding
the formation of opinions since it encapsulates the weight given to each agent (forceful
or regular) in the limiting mean consensus value of the society. We refer to the vector
p¯i as the consensus distribution corresponding to the mean interaction matrix W˜ and to
its component p¯ii as the weight of agent i.
It is also useful at this point to highlight how consensus will form around the correct
value in the absence of forceful agents. Let {x(k)} be the belief sequence generated by
the belief update rule of equation (20). When there are no forceful agents, i.e. αij = 0 for
all i, j, then the interaction matrix W (k) for all k is either equal to an averaging matrix
Aij for some i, j or equal to the identity matrix I; hence, W (k) is a doubly stochastic
matrix (i.e., it has both row and column sums equal to 1). This implies that the average
value of x(k) remains constant at each iteration and is given by
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0) for all k ≥ 0.
But since, by assumption, 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi(0) = θ, we have from Theorem 7 the following
simple but important corollary:
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Corollary 1 Assume that there are no forceful agents, i.e., αij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N . We
have
lim
k→∞
xi(k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0) = θ with probability one.
Therefore, in the absence of forceful agents, the society is able to aggregate informa-
tion effectively. Theorem 8 then also implies that in this case p¯ii = 1/n for all i (i.e.,
beliefs converge to a deterministic value), so that no individual has excess influence.
These results no longer hold when there are forceful agents.
We next study the effect of the forceful agents and the structure of the social network
on the extent of misinformation and excess influence of individuals. As a measure of the
extent of misinformation, we consider the expected value of the difference between the
consensus belief x¯ (cf. Theorem 7) and the true underlying state, θ (or equivalently the
average of the initial beliefs), i.e.,
E [x¯− θ] = E[x¯]− θ =
∑
i∈N
(
p¯ii − 1
n
)
xi(0), (26)
(cf. Theorem 8).
The next theorem provides a key result on characterizing the extent of misinformation
and establishes an upper bound on the l∞-norm of the difference between the stationary
distribution p¯i and the uniform distribution 1
n
e, which, from equation (26), also provides
a bound on the deviation between expected beliefs and the true underlying state, θ. The
proof uses results from Markov Chain Theory, which enable us to decompose the mean
interaction matrix W˜ in (24) into a component given by the social network matrix T ,
which is doubly stochastic, and an influence matrix D, which is the source of deviation
of Ex¯ from θ (see, in particular, Schweitzer (1968) and Haviv and Van Der Heyden
(1984)).
Theorem 9 (a) Let p¯i denote the consensus distribution. The l∞-norm of the differ-
ence between p¯i and 1
n
e is bounded by∥∥∥p¯i − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i,j pijαij
2n
,
where δ is a constant defined by
δ = (1− nχd) 1d ,
χ = min
(i,j)∈E
{
1
n
[
pij
1− γij
2
+ pji
1− γji
2
]}
,
and d is the maximum shortest path length in the graph (N , E) [cf. equation (19)].
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(b) Let x¯ be the limiting random variable of the sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N generated
by equation (20) (cf. Theorem 7). We have∣∣∣E[x¯]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i,j pijαij
2n
‖x(0)‖∞.
Before providing the intuition for the preceding theorem, we provide a related bound
on the l2-norm of the difference between p¯i and the uniform distribution
1
n
e in terms of
the second largest eigenvalue of the social network matrix T .
Theorem 10 Let p¯i denote the consensus distribution (cf. Theorem 8). The l2-norm of
the difference between p¯i and 1
n
e is given by∥∥∥p¯i − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
1− λ2(T )
∑
i,j pijαij
n
,
where λ2(T ) is the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix T defined in equation (23).
Theorem 10 characterizes the variation of the stationary distribution in terms of
the average influence,
∑
i,j pijαij
n
, which captures the importance of forceful agent in the
society, and in terms of structural properties of the social network as represented by
the matrix T—in particular, its second largest eigenvalue λ2(T ). As is well known, the
difference 1−λ2(T ), also referred to as the spectral gap, governs the rate of convergence
of the Markov Chain induced by the social network matrix T to its stationary distri-
bution. In particular, the larger 1− λ2(T ) is, the faster the kth power of the transition
probability matrix converges to the stationary distribution matrix. When the Markov
chain converges to its stationary distribution rapidly, we say that the Markov chain is
fast-mixing.
In this light, Theorem 10 shows that, in a fast-mixing graph, given a fixed av-
erage influence
∑
i,j pijαij
n
, the consensus distribution is “closer” to the underlying
θ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi(0) and the extent of misinformation is limited. This is intuitive. In
a fast-mixing social network graph, there are several connections between any pair of
agents. Now for any forceful agent, consider the set of agents who will have some in-
fluence on his beliefs. This set itself is connected to the rest of the agents and thus
obtains information from the rest of the society. Therefore, in a fast-mixing graph (or
in a society represented by such a graph), the beliefs of forceful agents will themselves
be moderated by the rest of the society before they spread widely. In contrast, in a
slowly-mixing graph, we can have a high degree of clustering around forceful agents, so
that forceful agents get their (already limited) information intake mostly from the same
agents that they have influenced. If so, there will be only a very indirect connection from
the rest of the society to the beliefs of forceful agents and forceful agents will spread their
information widely before their opinions also adjust. As a result, the consensus is more
46
likely to be much closer to the opinions of forceful agents, potentially quite different
from the true underlying state θ.
This discussion also gives the intuition for Theorem 9 since the constant δ in that
result is closely linked to the mixing properties of the social network matrix and the
social network graph. In particular, Theorem 9 clarifies that δ is related to the maximum
shortest path and the minimum probability of (indirect) communication between any
two agents in the society. These two notions also crucially influence the spectral gap
1− λ2(Tn), which plays a key role in Theorem 10.
There are several important implications of the model presented in this subsection
and its analysis. First, the model has introduced a tractable variant of the DeGroot
model, with an arguably easier interpretation and more limited duplication of informa-
tion. Second, it has incorporated forceful agents, which give us a way of introducing
belief manipulation and spread of misinformation. Third, because of the no man is an
island assumption, despite the presence of forceful agents and the possibility of misinfor-
mation being spread, beliefs converge to a consensus in the long run, albeit a stochastic
consensus. This is both a convenient implication, because it makes further analysis feasi-
ble and relatively straightforward, and a negative implication, because it does not allow
the emergence of persistent disagreement. Finally, the analysis in this subsection has
shown how one can go considerably beyond the question of whether there is (stochas-
tic or nonstochastic) consensus and provide a full characterization of the divergence
between consensus beliefs and a benchmark corresponding to a simple notion of aggre-
gation of dispersed information. In particular, this analysis has shown that this measure
of divergence depends on the presence and importance of forceful agents and structural
properties of the social network (in particular, on the second-largest eigenvalue, which
captures how fast mixing the Markov chain induced by the social network of the society
is).
4.3 Persistent Disagreement
The no man is an island assumption played a crucial role in the previous subsection
in ensuring that the beliefs of the forceful agents are affected (even if infrequently) by
the beliefs of the rest of the society. This feature then underpinned the emergence
of (stochastic) consensus, which enabled the rest of the analysis to be conducted in a
relatively simple manner. While the “no man is an island” is a plausible assumption for
forceful agents, it may not be a good description of how those trying to manipulate the
beliefs of others or spread misinformation may act. For example, it may be realistic to
assume this feature when one of the agents in a village or in a community has a leadership
role, but still listens to the rest of the group, but it may be highly implausible when we
want to have a stylized description of how state media in authoritarian regimes such as
Iran or China might try to manipulate the beliefs of its citizens. In this subsection, we
relax this assumption. In addition to providing a generalization of the learning model
presented in the previous subsection, this will enable us to have a framework in which
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disagreement among agents may be a long-run phenomenon despite the fact that the
society is strongly connected.
More specifically, we consider a model with (fully) stubborn agents which are similar
to the forceful agents in the previous subsection but never update their opinions and
continuously influence those of the rest of the society. This model is developed and
studied in Acemoglu, Como, Fagnani, and Ozdaglar (2010). We show that the presence
of these agents leads to persistent disagreements among the rest of the society—because
different individuals are within the “sphere of influence” of distinct stubborn agents and
are influenced to varying degrees.
Consider a population N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, communicating and exchanging
information. As in the previous two sections, each agent starts with an opinion xi(0) ∈ R
and is then “recognized” according to a rate-1 independent Poisson process in continuous
time. Following this event, she meets one of the agents in her neighborhood according
to a stochastic matrix P . We shall identify agents with the vertices of a (directed) graph
G = (N , E), representing an underlying social network, where (i, j) ∈ E if and only if
Pij > 0.
As noted above, stubborn agents are those that never change or update their opinions,
and we think of them as typically few in number. The (nonempty) set of stubborn agents
is denoted by S ⊆ N . The remaining agents are referred to as regular agents, and their
set is denoted by A ≡ N \S. These regular agents update their beliefs to some weighted
average of their pre-meeting belief and the belief of the agent they met. Specifically, we
assume that, if agent a ∈ A is recognized at time t ≥ 0, and meets agent v ∈ N , then
her belief jumps from its current value xa(t
−) to
xa(t) = (1− θ)xa(t−) + θxv(t−),
where xv(t
−) denotes the limit limu↑t xv(u). All other agents’ beliefs remain constant.
The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1) represents the trust that regular agent a puts on agent v’s belief
(here assumed to be constant over all agents and over time for notational simplicity).
We denote the vector of beliefs at time t by x(t) ∈ RN and study its long-run
behavior, under the assumption that the graph G is strongly connected, which implies
that the induced continuous-time Markov chain (i.e., the Markov chain with set of states
given by N and transition probability matrix P ) admits a unique stationary probability
distribution, denoted by pi, supported over all N .
The next theorem shows that, in contrast to the models we have seen so far, opinions
no longer converge to a consensus. Instead, they exhibit both persistent disagreement
and persistent fluctuations.
Theorem 11 Assume that xs(0) 6= xs′(0) for some s, s′ ∈ S. Then, with probability
one, x(t) does not converge.
From a substantive point of view, this is one of the central results of the model. In
particular, it shows that with probability one, opinions fail to converge. Thus persistent
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disagreement will remain, and in fact, all opinions will fluctuate even in the long run.
Notably, there is persistent disagreement despite the fact that the social network in
the society is strongly connected and thus the opinion of each regular agent can be
(indirectly) influenced by that of any other regular agent. Disagreement arises because
of the constant pull of the society in different directions by the influence of stubborn
agents.
Nevertheless, we can show that regardless of the initial values of regular agents’
beliefs, the belief vector x(k) is convergent in distribution to a random vector X. Recall
that this means that the probability law of x(t), to be denoted by L(x(t)), converges,
according to the weak-* topology, to L(X), the probability law of an RN -valued random
variable X, i.e.,
lim
t→+∞
E[ϕ(x(t))] = E[ϕ(X)] ,
for all bounded and continuous test functions ϕ : RN → R.
Theorem 12 For every value of the stubborn agents’ beliefs {xs(0)} ∈ RS , there exists
an RN -valued random variable X, such that
lim
t→+∞
x(t) = X ,
in distribution.
As in the previous subsection, we next derive results linking the social network struc-
ture to the distribution of asymptotic beliefs. We focus on the empirical average of
beliefs:
αv ≡ lim
k→+∞
1
t
∫ t
0
xv(u)du v ∈ N .
Standard ergodic theorems for Markov chains imply that agent beliefs are ergodic, there-
fore the the preceding limit is given by the expected value of the random vector X,
i.e., αv = E[Xv] for all v ∈ N , independent of the distribution of x(0). We refer to
α = [αv]v∈N as the expected asymptotic belief vector. The next theorem provides an
explicit characterization of α.
Theorem 13 The expected asymptotic belief vector α is the unique solution of the fol-
lowing Laplace equation
((P − I)α)a = 0 for all a ∈ A,
with boundary conditions αs = xs(0) for all s ∈ S.
Here ((P − I)α)a refers to the ath element of the vector ((P − I)α). The reason why
we do not have ((P − I)α) = 0 is that this vector also includes the stubborn agents,
whereas the requirement ((P − I)α)a = 0 is only for a ∈ A, i.e., only for regular agents.
This theorem provides us with an explicit expression for the expected asymptotic belief
49
vector α. In fact, α admits the following standard representation (see Aldous and Fill,
Ch. 2, Lemma 27 (2002)):
αv =
∑
s∈S
Pv(τS = τ s)xs(0) , for all v ∈ N ,
where Pv( · ) denotes the probability measure associated with a continuous-time random
walk V (t), with initial state V (0) = v, transition rates P , while τW ≡ inf{t ≥ 0 :
V (t) ∈ W} denotes the hitting time of an arbitrary subsetW ⊆ N . This representation
enables us to compute α exactly for certain social network topologies. In cases when
the expected asymptotic belief vector α cannot be explicitly computed in a simple way,
it is possible to provide bounds on its dispersion.
Theorem 14 Assume that the stochastic matrix P is reversible. Then, for all  > 0,
we have
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣{v ∣∣∣ |αv −∑
u∈N
piuαu| ≥ ∆∗
}∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 log(2e2/) τnpi∗Epi[τS ] ,
where ∆∗ ≡ maxs,s′∈S xs(0)− xs′(0), pi∗ ≡ minu piu, Epi[ · ] denotes the expectation of the
random walk V (t) with initial distribution pi, and τ is the (variational distance) mixing
time of the random walk V (t), i.e.,
τ ≡ inf{t ≥ 0 | ‖Pv(V (t) = · )− Pv′(V (t) = · )‖TV ≤ e−1 , ∀v, v′ ∈ N}.
Theorem 14 therefore provides a bound on the stationary distribution of beliefs in
terms of the beliefs and the belief differences of the stubborn agents and structural
properties of the social network, in particular as captured by the mixing time τ (in the
same way that mixing times were important in the previous subsection). Intuitively, the
theorem states that if the Markov chain V (t) mixes in time faster than the expected
hitting time of the stubborn agent set S, then it will eventually hit any of them with
approximately equal probability, and thus the expected asymptotic opinions do not vary
much over the network.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided an overview of recent work on opinion dynamics and
learning in social networks. We emphasized the insights and the shortcomings of both
Bayesian and non-Bayesian approaches. Our focus has been on mathematical models
linking the dynamics of opinions to the distribution of prior beliefs, the form of updating
(e.g., Bayesian vs. non-Bayesian) and crucially to the structural properties of the social
network in which agents are situated. In particular, we highlighted the importance of
these factors on three sets of questions:
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a. Consensus: will social learning lead different individuals, who might start with
different views (priors) and observe the actions of and engage in communication
with different subsets of the society, to hold beliefs that are in agreement?
b. Asymptotic learning : will social learning effectively aggregate dispersed informa-
tion?
c. Misinformation: will media sources, “prominent agents,” politicians and officers
of the state be able to manipulate the beliefs of individuals, indoctrinate them and
convince them of views that may not have the backing of data and evidence?
We have emphasized that even when agents are Bayesian and start with fairly accu-
rate models of the world, that is, the correct understanding of how signals are generated
and reasonable priors, asymptotic learning may not emerge because selfish behavior by
each agent need not lead to the aggregation of dispersed information. Even though
they do not guarantee asymptotic learning, Bayesian models create a strong tendency
towards consensus and they limit the extent to which misinformation can arise (because
Bayesian agents are relatively difficult to fool).
We then showed that some benchmark models of non-Bayesian learning also lead to
consensus and similarly are unlikely to lead to asymptotic learning. The forces that lead
to consensus also preclude the emergence of persistent disagreements and this feature
might put limits on the extent of misinformation. We then outlined some recent work
on the spread of misinformation and persistent long-run disagreement and linking these
features to the structural properties of social networks in which communication and
learning take place.
Our overview has been purposefully partial. A large amount of work on learning,
opinion formation and communication has either been mentioned only in passing or has
been ignored, because it is less directly related to our focus. We have also concentrated
on mathematical models that enable the study of links between the structure of social
networks and opinion dynamics. There are several areas upon which we touched only
briefly and some which we could not mention because of space constraints that are
important areas for future research. We end the paper by a brief discussion of some of
these.
1. To enable sharp mathematical characterization, we have throughout focused on
long-run properties of opinion dynamics. For example, rather than asking whether
incorrect beliefs can persist for a long time, we have investigated whether there is
asymptotic learning, meaning whether in the very long-run society will arrive at the
correct beliefs and actions. Opinion dynamics away from this very long-run limit
are often important and interesting, but more difficult to study. Moreover, even
if there is asymptotic learning, the rate at which different societies arrive at this
might be very very different (as briefly mentioned in Section 3). The development
of more powerful mathematical tools to study opinion dynamics away from the
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long-run stationary distribution and to investigate the rates at which the long-run
distribution is reached constitutes an important area for future research.
2. Also to facilitate analysis, we have focused on models in which actions are either
implicit (as in the models in Section 4) or each agent only takes a single action (as
in the models in Section 3). An important area for future research is to consider
models in which individuals interact with others repeatedly and update their in-
formation dynamically taking into account implications of this information both
today and in the future.
3. We have emphasized repeatedly that non-Bayesian models provides several useful
insights, but that they also have several ad hoc features and properties such as the
“duplication of information” of the DeGroot model, which are unattractive (and
which, in particular, we might expect that they would not survive in the long run).
An interesting area of study is to develop more adaptive non-Bayesian models in
which such easily identifiable myopic behavior is avoided by changes in the relevant
rules of thumbs, at least in the long run.
4. We have seen that individuals’ conjectures about others’ behavior plays a crucial
role in Bayesian models. These considerations are entirely absent in non-Bayesian
models. It would also be interesting to extend non-Bayesian models to incorporate
some of these concerns. For example, even if individuals are not Bayesian, they
might worry about how to draw inferences from the behavior of others and about
whether some other agents are trying to mislead them.
5. Models of misinformation and persistent disagreement are very much in their in-
fancy. We have presented only one approach to these questions. Given the ubiquity
of these issues in practice, more work is necessary to understand how misinforma-
tion spreads to some parts of the society and how individuals that communicate
and share the same sources of information might nonetheless disagree significantly
even in the very long run. It would be particularly important to see how such long-
run disagreement is possible even when more Bayesian features are introduced or
non-Bayesian models are made more adaptive.
6. In the area of persistent disagreement, it is also interesting to study whether per-
sistent disagreement will lead to a situation in which there are clusters of relatively
unchanging opinions within different parts of the social network, or whether there
is greater fluidity and different types of opinions spread and retreat throughout
the network at different points.
7. More work is also necessary on modeling indoctrination and belief manipulation.
While the spread of misinformation in social networks gives us some clues about
these issues, indoctrination in practice is often carried out by political movements
or by the state using several instruments. Control of schools and the media might
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be particularly important. Currently, we know relatively little on this important
topic.
8. Issues of misinformation also open up another area of study: if there will period-
ically be new sources of misinformation, either from parties that are purposefully
trying to manipulate beliefs or because some agents and community leaders are
stubborn and will not change their opinion even if these are not strongly based
on the facts, then it becomes important to understand what types of societies and
social structures are “robust” to the spread of misinformation and what can be
done, from a design perspective, to make society more robust and opinions more
stable or less subject to manipulation.
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